The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law by A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF LAW
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Steven Shavell
Working Paper 11780
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11780
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
November 2005
To appear in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 1,
forthcoming 2006.  Stanford Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research; and Harvard Law
School and National Bureau of Economic Research. Research on this article was supported by the John M.
Olin law and economics programs at Stanford Law School and Harvard Law School. An earlier version of
portions of this chapter appeared in Polinsky and Shavell (2000a). We are at work on a book-length treatment
of public enforcement of law.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
NBER Working Paper No. 11780
November 2005
JEL No. D23, D62, D63, H23, H26, K14, K42, L51
ABSTRACT
This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public
enforcement of law – the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police,
prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis
addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party
be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two? Should the rule of liability be strict
or fault-based? If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of the sanction
be adjusted? How much of society’s resources should be devoted to apprehending violators? We
then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, including: activity level; errors; the costs
of imposing fines; general enforcement; marginal deterrence; the principal-agent relationship;
settlements;  self-reporting;  repeat  offenders;  imperfect  knowledge  about  the  probability  and
magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and
the fairness of sanctions.
A Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
and NBER
polinsky@stanford.edu
Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Hauser Hall 508
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
shavell@law.harvard.edu 
 
 
- 3 - 
                                                
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Public enforcement of law — the use of governmental agents to detect and to sanction 
violators of legal rules —  is a subject of obvious importance.  Police and prosecutors endeavor 
to solve crimes and to punish criminals, regulators  attempt to control violations of 
environmental, safety, consumer protection, and financial disclosure laws, and agents of the 
Internal Revenue Service seek to enforce the tax code.   
The earliest economically-oriented writing on the subject of public law enforcement dates 
from the eighteenth century contributions of Montesquieu (1748), Beccaria (1767), and, 
especially, Bentham (1789).  Curiously, after Bentham, the subject of law enforcement lay 
essentially dormant in economic scholarship until the late 1960s, when Becker (1968) published 
a highly influential article.  Since then, several hundred articles have been written on the 
economics of law enforcement.
1 
The main purpose of our chapter is to present the economic theory of public law 
enforcement in a systematic and comprehensive way.
2  The theoretical core of our analysis 
addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable 
party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of the two?  Should the rule of liability 
be strict or fault-based?  If violators are caught only with a probability, how should the level of 
the sanction be adjusted?  How much of society’s resources should be devoted to apprehending 
violators? 
The chapter is outlined as follows.  We begin in section 2 by considering the rationale for 
 
1 See, for example, the references cited in Bouckaert and De Geest (1992, pp. 504-526), Garoupa (1997), 
Mookherjee (1997), and Polinsky and Shavell (2000a). 
2 For other surveys of the theory of public enforcement, see Garoupa (1997) and Mookherjee (1997).  For 
surveys of empirical research on law enforcement and crime, see Eide (2000) and Levitt and Miles (2006), and for a 
survey of empirical research on enforcement of environmental regulation, see Cohen (1999, pp. 78-95).  
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public enforcement of law, that is, by asking why society cannot rely exclusively on private 
enforcement of law to control undesirable behavior.  We then state the problem of public 
enforcement of law in general terms in section 3.  In sections 4 through 6, we analyze strict 
liability and fault-based liability when enforcement is certain, first considering monetary 
sanctions, next non-monetary sanctions, and then the two together.  In sections 7 through 9, we 
perform the same analysis when enforcement is uncertain because it is costly.  In section 10 we 
summarize the theory, and in section 11 we discuss enforcement practices in the light of the 
theory we have reviewed. 
We subsequently examine a variety of extensions of our core analysis in sections 12 
through 28.  These concern mistake, the costs of imposing sanctions, marginal deterrence, the 
settlement process, self-reporting of violations, corruption of law enforcers, and the fairness of 
sanctions, among other topics.  We conclude in section 29. 
 
2.  WHY PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT RATHER THAN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT? 
Before proceeding, we should comment on the rationale for public, as opposed to private, 
law enforcement, where, by the latter, we mean the bringing of suits by victims of harm or those 
threatened by harm.  An important element of the justification for private enforcement concerns 
information about the identity of violators.  When victims of harm naturally possess knowledge 
of who injured them, allowing private suits for harm will motivate victims to initiate legal action 
and thus will harness the information they have for purposes of law enforcement.  This may help 
to explain why, for example, the enforcement of contract law and tort law is primarily private in 
nature: a victim of a contract breach obviously knows who committed the breach, and a victim of 
a tort usually knows who the tortfeasor was.  When, however, victims cannot easily identify who 
injured them, it may be desirable for public enforcement to be employed.    
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For public enforcement to be preferred in such circumstances, one still needs to explain 
why society cannot rely on rewards of some type to private parties other than victims (such as 
friends of violators or entrepreneurial private enforcers) to supply information and otherwise 
help in detecting violators.  A difficulty with reliance on private enforcement of this sort is that if 
a reward is available to everyone, there might be wasteful effort devoted to finding violators 
(akin to excessive effort to catch fish from a common pool).  Another problem is that private 
parties may find it hard to capture fully the benefits of developing expensive, but socially 
worthwhile, information systems to aid enforcement (such as computerized databases of 
fingerprint records).  An additional obstacle to private enforcement is that force may be needed 
to gather information, capture violators, and prevent reprisal, yet the state frequently, if not 
usually, will not want to permit private parties to use force.  For the preceding reasons, public 
enforcement often will be favored when effort is required to identify and apprehend violators.
3 
  
3.  THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The general problem of public law enforcement may be viewed as one of maximizing 
social welfare.  By social welfare, we refer to the benefits that individuals obtain from their 
behavior, less the costs that they incur to avoid causing harm, the harm that they do cause, the 
cost of catching violators, and the costs of imposing sanctions on them (including any costs 
associated with risk aversion).  We will be explicit below about the definition of social welfare in 
the various contexts that we consider. 
 
3 The differences between public and private enforcement have been discussed by Becker and Stigler 
(1974), Landes and Posner (1975), and Polinsky (1980a); see also Shavell (1993) and Friedman (1995).  In this 
chapter, we assume for simplicity that public enforcement is the exclusive means of enforcement, even though in 
practice private parties sometimes play a complementary role by supplying information to enforcement authorities 
and by bringing private suits.  We also abstract from private parties’ efforts to protect themselves from harm (and 
how such efforts might relate to public enforcement), though we mention this issue in the conclusion.   
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  The state has four major policy choices to make in undertaking law enforcement.  One is 
about the sanctioning rule.  The rule could be strict in the sense that a party is sanctioned 
whenever he has been found to have caused harm (or expected harm).  Alternatively, the rule 
could be fault-based, meaning that a party who has been found to have caused harm is 
sanctioned only if he failed to obey some standard of behavior or regulatory requirement. 
A second choice of the state concerns the form of the sanction: monetary versus non-
monetary (both may be employed together).  We focus on imprisonment as the primary type of 
non-monetary sanction and we assume that monetary sanctions are socially less costly to employ 
than imprisonment. 
  A third choice involves the magnitude of the sanction. 
And the fourth choice concerns the probability of detecting offenders and imposing 
sanctions. This probability depends on the public resources devoted to finding violators and 
proving that they are liable.
4 
 
A.  BASIC THEORY WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS CERTAIN 
4.  MONETARY SANCTIONS 
  In this section we analyze the optimal magnitude of monetary sanctions — which we call 
fines — assuming that enforcement is certain.   We consider the two basic forms of liability, 
beginning with strict liability. 
Suppose that individuals would obtain a gain from committing a harmful act, where the 
gain varies among them.  If an individual does commit the act, he will have to pay a fine because 
 
4 The framework for studying public law enforcement employed in this chapter derives, in many respects, 
from Bentham (1789).  Becker (1968) first stated the enforcement problem in formal economic terms and added the 
choice of the probability of detection to Bentham's expression of the enforcement problem. 
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he is strictly liable.  Let 
         g = gain an individual obtains if he commits the harmful act;  
     z(g) = density of gains among individuals; 
         h = harm caused by an individual if he commits the harmful act;
5 
         f  = fine; and 
        w = level of wealth of an individual. 
The gain could be a literal benefit, for instance, the utility obtained from taking food from a 
cabin in the wilderness, or the savings from not investing in some precaution, such as not 
obtaining pollution control equipment.
6  The fine cannot exceed an individual’s level of wealth, 
which is assumed to be the same for everyone. 
An individual will commit the harmful act if and only if his gain from doing so exceeds 
the fine:
7 g > f. 
Social welfare equals the gains individuals obtain from committing the harmful act less 
the harm caused.
8  Social welfare is not directly affected by the imposition of fines because the 
payment of a fine is assumed to be a socially costless transfer of money.
9  Since the individuals 
 
5 If the harm is uncertain, h can be interpreted as expected harm instead of actual harm; see section 12. 
 
6 For simplicity, we assume that the gain is not itself available to pay the fine.  This assumption would hold 
if the gain were non-monetary, as in the example of the utility benefit from taking food from a cabin.  In many 
circumstances, the assumption would not be fitting, but the complications introduced by considering how the gain 
enhances an individual’s ability to pay a fine would be distracting. 
 
7 We assume for simplicity that he does not commit the harmful act if he is indifferent. 
8 Some writers have questioned whether gains from committing harmful acts should necessarily be credited 
in social welfare; see, for example, Stigler (1970, p. 527) and Lewin and Trumbull (1990).  If the gains from some 
type of harmful conduct were excluded from social welfare, the main consequence for our analysis would be that, 
for this type of conduct, society would want to achieve greater, possibly complete, deterrence.  That, in turn, would 
tend to make a higher sanction and a higher probability of detection desirable. 
9 In practice, of course, some costs are incurred in collecting fines, such as the cost of identifying and 
confiscating the individual’s assets if the individual resists paying the fine.  We discuss the implications of such 
costs in section 16.  
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who commit the harmful act are those whose gains exceed the fine, social welfare is 
                                                                 4 
                                                                 I(g – h)z(g)dg. (1) 
                                                                        f 
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social welfare by choosing the fine 
f.  We use an asterisk to denote the optimal value of the fine (and other variables below).  It is 
clear from (1) that 
  f* = h, (2) 
assuming that such a fine is feasible.  Hence, individuals commit the harmful act if and only if 
their gain exceeds the harm, which is first-best behavior.  Note, however, that there will be 
underdeterrence if the individual’s wealth is less than h, in which case the optimal fine equals the 
individual’s wealth. 
  Now consider the fault-based sanctioning rule, in which an individual who causes harm is 
sanctioned only if he failed to obey some standard of behavior.  In the present framework, we 
assume that if an individual commits a harmful act, his gain must equal or exceed some threshold 
level of gain in order for him to escape liability; otherwise, he is considered to be at fault.  Let 
         g
^ = threshold level of gain under the fault-based sanctioning rule. 
If an individual’s gain is less than g
^ he will commit the harmful act whenever g > f, while 
if his gain equals or exceeds g
^, he will commit the harmful act regardless of his gain.  In other 
words, the individual will commit the harmful act under fault-based liability if g > min(f, g
^).  
Thus, social welfare is 
                                                                4 
                                                                I(g – h)z(g)dg. (3) 
                                                            min(f, g
^) 
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize (3) by choosing the standard g
^ and 
the fine f .  It is straightforward to see that  
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  f* = g
^* = h (4) 
results in first-best behavior.  In particular, if g < h, the individual would be at fault if he 
committed the harmful act, and would bear a fine equal to h, so he would not commit it.  If g $ h, 
he would not be at fault if he committed the harmful act and therefore would not have to pay 
anything, so he would commit the act.  Note that f* and g
^* are not unique: first-best behavior 
also can be achieved by setting g
^ > h, with f = h, or by keeping g
^ = h and setting f > h. 
  Although we have seen that the first-best outcome can be achieved under both strict 
liability and fault-based liability (when a fine equal to h is feasible), the two forms of liability 
differ in the information required to implement them.  To apply strict liability, the state only 
needs to know the harm.  Under fault-based liability, however, the state needs to know more: it 
also needs to ascertain the gain of the individual (to determine whether he was at fault).  
  To illustrate strict and fault-based liability, suppose that a firm contemplates whether to 
discharge a pollutant that would cause harm h, rather than to transport it to a waste disposal site 
at cost g.  Under strictly-imposed fines, the firm would incur a fine of h if it pollutes, so would 
not do so unless its savings from not transporting the waste, g, is greater than h.  Under fault-
based fines, a polluting firm would incur a fine of h only if the cost of transporting the waste g is 
less than h; thus, the firm would pollute only if g$ h. 
 
5.  NONMONETARY SANCTIONS 
  In this section we analyze the optimal magnitude of nonmonetary sanctions —
 which we assume to be prison sentences
10 — when enforcement is certain.  Let 
 
10 It will be clear that most of what we have to say about imprisonment here and in subsequent 
sections would carry over, with only slight modification, to other forms of non-monetary sanctions, such as 
probation, electronic monitoring, community service, or, in the extreme, the death penalty.  
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         s = length of prison sentence, where s is in [0, sM]; and 
     d(s) = disutility from prison sentence of length s; d(0) = 0; dN(s) > 0. 
The maximum sentence sM can be interpreted as life imprisonment, and is assumed to be the 
same for everyone. 
Under strict liability, if an individual commits the harmful act, he will bear a prison 
sentence.
11  Thus, he will commit the act if and only if his gain from doing so exceeds the 
disutility of the prison sentence: g > d(s). 
Social welfare equals the gains individuals obtain from committing the harmful act, less 
the harm caused, and less the cost of imposing prison sentences.  The cost of prison sentences is 
the sum of the disutility suffered by the sanctioned individuals and the cost to the state of 
maintaining a prison system.  Let 
          c = cost to the state per unit of prison sentence; c > 0. 
Thus, social welfare is  
                                                     4 
                                                     I[g – h – (d(s) + cs)]z(g)dg. (5) 
                                                        d(s) 
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social welfare by choosing the 
prison sentence s.  From (5), the first-order condition can be written as 
                                                                      4 
 ( h + cs)(dZ(d(s))/ds) = I[dN(s) + c]z(g)dg, (6) 
                                                                                                d(s) 
 
where Z(.) is the cumulative distribution function for z(.).  The left-hand side is the marginal 
benefit of raising s: h + cs is the social gain from deterring the marginal individuals, while 
 
11 Strict liability is in fact an unusual form of liability when the sanction is imprisonment.  (An example of 
a strict liability criminal offense is the serving of liquor by a bar to underage individuals.)  As will be seen, fault-
based liability tends to be superior to strict liability when the sanction is imprisonment. 
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dZ(d(s))/ds is the number of such individuals deterred.
12  The right-hand side is the marginal cost 
of raising s: individuals who are not deterred incur additional disutility dN(s) and cause the state 
to incur additional imprisonment costs c. 
  The optimal prison sentence could lead to either underdeterrence or overdeterrence due to 
the costs of prison sentences.  To see why, suppose the sentence were such that individuals 
committed the harmful act if and only if their gain equaled the harm.  If the sentence were raised 
above this level, some individuals would be deterred, which would reduce prison costs, but those 
who would not be deterred would bear longer sentences.  Depending on which effect is stronger, 
it may be desirable to raise, or lower, the sentence, leading to overdeterrence or underdeterrence. 
 Note that a marginal change of the sentence from the initial level does not affect the gains net of 
the harm because the marginal individuals are those whose gains equal the harm.  
  Regardless of whether the optimal prison sentence causes underdeterrence or 
overdeterrence, the strict sanctioning rule does not achieve the first-best outcome because it leads 
to the imposition of costly sanctions.  
  Now consider the fault-based sanctioning rule, with a standard g
^.  Analogously to the 
case of fines, an individual will commit the harmful act under fault-based liability if g > min(s, g
^
).  If s < g
^, then there will be some individuals who commit the harmful act who will be found at 
fault, those for whom s < g < g
^.  Then social welfare would be 
                                                4                               g
^ 
                                                I(g – h)z(g)dg – I(d(s) + cs)z(g)dg. (7) 
                                                s                               s 
If s $ g
^, then social welfare is 
 
 
 
 
12 The disutility of imprisonment and the benefit from committing the harmful act do not appear in (6) 
because they offset each other for the marginal person. 
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                                                                  4                       
                                                                  I(g – h)z(g)dg. (8) 
                                                                  g
^                    
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize (7) or (8) by choosing the standard g
^ 
and the sentence s .  It is straightforward to see that 
  s* = g
^* = h (9) 
results in the first-best outcome.  First observe that first-best behavior will occur.  In particular, if 
g < h, the individual would be at fault if he committed the harmful act, and bear a sentence equal 
to h, so he would not commit it.  If g $ h, he would not be at fault if he committed the harmful 
act and therefore would not bear any sentence, so he would commit the act.  Second, given (9), 
costly sanctions will not be imposed because individuals will never choose to be at fault.  Hence, 
the first-best outcome is achieved.  Note that s* and g
^* are not unique: the first-best outcome 
also can be achieved by keeping g
^ = h and setting s > h.   
  The preceding discussion shows that when sanctions are costly, the fault-based 
sanctioning rule is superior to the strict sanctioning rule.  Not only does the fault-based rule lead 
to first-best deterrence, it does so without anyone actually incurring a costly sanction.
13 
 
6.  COMBINED SANCTIONS 
  In this section we consider the optimal mix of fines and imprisonment sanctions when 
they can be used together.  Under the strict sanctioning rule, social welfare in this case is 
                                                     4 
                                                     I[g – h – (d(s) + cs)]z(g)dg. (10) 
                                                  f + d(s) 
 
First observe that it cannot be optimal to employ a prison sentence unless the fine has 
been set as high as possible, equal to individuals’ wealth level w.  To see why, suppose  
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otherwise, that f < w and s > 0.  Then it would be possible to raise f and lower s so as to keep f + 
d(s) constant, thereby leaving behavior unaffected but lowering the cost of imprisonment (see 
(10)). 
  Whether it is optimal to use a prison sentence in addition to a fine depends on whether a 
fine alone is sufficient to achieve first-best deterrence.  If wealth levels are high enough, if w $ h, 
then a fine equal to harm is feasible and there would be no need for a prison sentence.  If, 
however, w < h, then relying on fines alone would lead to underdeterrence and it might be 
desirable to employ a prison sentence in addition to the maximal fine of w.  To see whether a 
prison sentence would be desirable in these circumstances, consider the derivative of (10) with 
respect to the sentence s when f = w: 
                                                                                 4 
                            [h – w + cs][dZ(w + d(s))/ds] –  I(dN(s) + c)]z(g)dg. (11) 
                                                                             w + d(s) 
 
It follows that the condition for a positive prison sentence to be optimal is that 
 
                                                                        4 
                                       [h – w][dZ(w)/ds] > I(dN(0) + c)]z(g)dg. (12) 
                                                                       w 
 
The left-hand side of (12) is the value of deterring the marginal individuals, while the right-hand 
side is the marginal cost of imposing prison sentences on individuals who are not deterred.  If a 
positive prison sentence is socially desirable, it is determined from the first-order condition 
associated with (11). 
  Next consider the optimal mix of fines and imprisonment under the fault-based 
sanctioning rule.  The key point is that, unlike under strict liability, it is always desirable to 
employ prison sentences to obtain compliance with the fault standard if fines alone are 
inadequate to do so.  This is because, as noted above, sanctions are not actually imposed when 
 
13 But see section 15 below on the possibility of error and thus of the bearing of sanctions.  
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the fault standard is complied with, so there is no social cost from using the threat of prison 
sentences to obtain compliance.  Thus, any combination of fines and prison sentences that 
induces potential offenders to comply with the fault standard is optimal.  
 
B.  BASIC THEORY WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS UNCERTAIN 
In this part we investigate the level of enforcement resources that the state should devote 
to detecting offenders.  We assume that the higher the level of expenditures on enforcement, the 
greater is the probability of detection.  Let 
         e = enforcement expenditures by the state; and 
    p(e) = probability of detection given e; pN(e) >0; pO(e) < 0. 
We derive the optimal probability of detection
14 and, along with it, the optimal magnitude of 
sanctions.
15 
 
7.  MONETARY SANCTIONS 
  In this section we analyze the optimal probability and magnitude of fines, first assuming 
that individuals are risk neutral and then that they are risk averse. 
7.1  The Risk-Neutral Case 
Under the strict liability rule, an individual will commit the harmful act if and only if his 
 
 
14 We implicitly assume that enforcement expenditures e determine a single probability of detection.  Thus, 
we do not consider an issue identified by Lando and Shavell (2004), that it may be advantageous to concentrate 
enforcement resources on a subset of potential offenders (for example, by auditing taxpayers whose last names begin 
with certain letters) rather than to spread enforcement resources evenly. 
 
15 Although we assume that the probability of detection can be set independently of the level of sanctions, 
the two might be connected. This is because high sanctions may lead juries to be less likely to convict defendants, or 
may induce individuals to engage in greater efforts to avoid detection; on these points, see Andreoni (1991) and 
Malik (1990), respectively.  See also Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) for a discussion of how the level of crime affects 
both the probability and magnitude of sanctions.  
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gain from doing so exceeds the expected fine: g > pf.  Social welfare, which now reflects the 
enforcement expenditures of the state, is 
                                                                4 
                                                                I(g – h)z(g)dg – e. (13) 
                                                                    p(e)f 
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize (13) by choosing enforcement expenditures 
e (and thus the probability of detection p), as well as the level of the fine f. 
Before considering the complete problem, suppose that enforcement expenditures are 
fixed, resulting in the probability of detection p.  It is obvious that if pf = h, namely, the expected 
fine equals the harm, (13) will be maximized over f since the first-best outcome will be achieved. 
 In other words,  
  f* = h/p, (14) 
assuming that such a fine is feasible.  Individuals then commit the harmful act if and only if their 
gain exceeds the harm, which is first-best behavior.
16  Note, however, that there will be 
underdeterrence if individuals’ wealth is less than h/p, in which case the optimal fine equals their 
wealth. 
Now suppose that both enforcement expenditures and the fine are chosen by the state.
17  
Then the optimal fine is maximal: f* = w.  To demonstrate this, suppose that f is less than w.  
Then f can be raised and e lowered so as to keep p(e)f  — the level of deterrence — constant.  
Because the behavior of individuals is unaffected but enforcement expenditures fall, social 
welfare rises (the first term in (13) does not change but e is lower).  Hence, the optimal f cannot 
be less than w.  In other words, because any particular level of deterrence can be achieved with 
 
16 The general formula (14), or its equivalent, was put forward by Bentham (1789, p. 173), was emphasized 
by Becker (1968), and has been noted by many others since then. 
17 Consideration of this issue originated with Becker (1968); as we noted, early writers on law enforcement 
did not examine the issue of the choice of enforcement effort.  
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different combinations of the fine and the probability of detection, society should employ the 
highest possible fine and a correspondingly low probability of detection in order to economize on 
enforcement expenditures.
18  
We next show that the optimal probability of detection is such that the expected fine is 
less than the harm, p(e*)w < h — that is, some degree of underdeterrence is desirable.  Observe 
that the first-order condition determining optimal enforcement expenditures e* is 
 [ h – p(e)w][dZ(p(e)w)/de] = 1.  (15) 
The left-hand side is the marginal social benefit of the deterrent effect from a higher probability 
of detection.  The right-hand side is the marginal cost of greater spending on enforcement.  It 
follows from (15) that p(e*)w < h.  To explain this result, suppose that p were such that pw = h.  
Then there would be no first-order loss of social welfare from lowering p because the individuals 
who would be induced to engage in the harmful activity would obtain gains equal to harm.  But 
enforcement costs would be saved, making it desirable to lower the probability.  How much p 
should be lowered depends on the resulting savings in enforcement expenses compared to the net 
social costs of underdeterrence.
19 
  Under fault-based liability, analogues of the above conclusions hold.  The optimal fine is 
maximal and the optimal probability of detection is such that the expected fine is less than the 
harm.  Moreover, the optimal fault standard is less than the first-best standard.  The explanation 
 
18 Although the general point that a low probability-high fine combination conserves enforcement costs is 
due to Becker (1968), he did not formally consider bounds on fines (and much of his analysis implicitly presumes 
that the optimal fine is not maximal).  Carr-Hill and Stern (1979, pp. 300-304) and Polinsky and Shavell (1979, pp. 
883-884) observed that Becker's argument implies that the optimal fine is equal to its upper bound.  Many scholars 
have noted the unrealism of this result and have introduced additional considerations that imply that less-than-
maximal fines are optimal.  We will discuss several important factors of this type, including risk aversion, general 
enforcement, and marginal deterrence.  See also Andreoni (1991), Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992; 1993), Malik 
(1990), and Polinsky and Shavell (1991;200b) for discussion of other such considerations. 
19 The point of this paragraph — that some underdeterrence is optimal — was first made by Polinsky and 
Shavell (1984).  
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for these results is essentially that given above.  The fine is maximal in order to reduce the 
probability of detection and thereby save enforcement costs, and some underdeterrence is 
desirable because this also allows savings in enforcement costs. 
  7.2  The Risk-Averse Case 
Now suppose that individuals are risk averse and that social welfare is the sum of 
expected utilities of individuals (in the risk-neutral case, social welfare was equivalent to the sum 
of utilities).  For convenience, assume that the risk of being harmed is the same for everyone and 
that individuals buy insurance against harm, paying a premium equal to the expected harm.  An 
individual’s wealth is his initial wealth, less the taxes he pays, less the expected harm he suffers, 
and less the fine if he has to pay it.  Let 
    U(.) = utility of wealth; U is concave in wealth; 
         t  = tax; and  
         λ  
                                                
= fraction of population that commits the harmful act. 
Both t and λ are endogenous. 
  An individual will commit the harmful act if g + (1 – p)U(w – t – λh) + pU(w – t – λh – f) 
is greater than U(w – t – λh), or equivalently, if 
  g > p[U(w – t – λh) – U(w – t – λh – f)]. (16) 
Note that we are implicitly assuming that the gain g is non-monetary.
20  The condition (16) 
implicitly determines the fraction of the population λ that commits the harmful act.  The tax t is 
such that the government breaks even; hence t equals the enforcement cost e less the fine revenue 
collected λpf. 
  Social welfare, the sum of individuals’ expected utilities, equals 
 
20 If the gain were monetary, then the condition would become (1 – p)U(w + g – t – λh) + pU(w + g – t – λh 
– f) > U(w – t – λh).  The qualitative nature of the results in this section would not be affected.    
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                                                 4 
             (1 – λ)U(w – t – λh) + I[g + (1 – p)U(w – t – λh) + pU(w – t – λh – f)]z(g)dg – e,        (17) 
                                  p[U(w – t – λh) – U(w – t – λh – f)] 
 
since the individuals who commit the harmful act are those whose gains exceed the expected 
disutility of the fine. 
Suppose initially that the probability of detection is fixed.  Then the optimal fine in the 
risk-averse case tends to be lower than that in the risk-neutral case for two reasons.  First, 
lowering the fine reduces the bearing of risk by individuals who commit the harmful act.  
Second, because risk-averse individuals are more easily deterred than risk-neutral individuals, 
the fine does not need to be as high to achieve any desired degree of deterrence.
21  
Now consider choosing both the probability and magnitude of fines.  The optimal fine 
generally is not at its maximum when individuals are risk averse.  This is because the use of a 
very high fine would impose a substantial risk-bearing cost on individuals who commit the 
harmful act.  More precisely, reconsider the argument employed in the risk-neutral case.  If f is 
less than the maximal fine (now w – t – λh), it still is true that f can be raised and e lowered so as 
to keep deterrence constant.  But due to risk aversion, the probability of detection that maintains 
deterrence falls more than proportionally, implying that the expected fine, and therefore fine 
revenue, falls.  This reduction in fine revenue reflects the disutility caused by imposing greater 
risk on risk-averse individuals.  If individuals are sufficiently risk averse, the decline in fine 
revenue associated with greater risk bearing could more than offset the savings in enforcement 
expenditures from reducing the probability of detection, implying that social welfare would be 
 
 
21 It is possible, however, that the optimal fine is higher in the risk-averse case than in the risk-neutral case, 
for the following reason.  A way to reduce the bearing of risk is to deter more individuals from committing the 
harmful act, for then fewer individuals will be subject to the risk of the fine.  See Kaplow (1992).  
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lower.
22 
In effect, when individuals are risk averse, fines become a socially costly sanction 
(reflected in an increase in taxes) rather than a mere transfer of wealth.  The more risk averse 
individuals are, the better it is to control their behavior by using a lower fine and a higher 
probability of detection, even though this raises enforcement costs. 
As in the risk-neutral case, there is a reason when individuals are risk averse to reduce 
enforcement costs by setting the probability such that some individuals will commit the harmful 
act even though their gain is less than the harm —meaning that there will be some 
underdeterrence.
23 
  Under fault-based liability, the conclusions are different from those under strict liability.  
The differences are due to the fact that individuals are induced to comply with the fault standard 
and therefore do not bear risk.  Consequently, the results are the same as those in the risk-neutral 
case: the optimal fine is maximal; the optimal probability is relatively low; and the optimal fault 
standard is such that there is some underdeterrence.  
  Because, as just emphasized, fines are not actually imposed under fault-based liability, 
fault-based liability is superior to strict liability, under which risk is borne.  This advantage of 
fault-based liability is analogous to the advantage of fault-based liability over strict liability 
when imprisonment is used — a costly sanction is not actually imposed.   
 
22 The point that the optimal fine may be less than maximal when individuals are risk averse was proved 
initially by Polinsky and Shavell (1979) in a model with two levels of gain.  See also Kaplow (1992), who 
demonstrates in an example that the fine may be less than maximal.  It can be shown in the general model under 
discussion here that the optimal fine must be less than maximal if the cost of raising the probability of detection is 
sufficiently small (given that the wealth of individuals is not too low).  The idea of the proof is that, if the cost of 
raising the probability were zero, the optimal probability would be one and the optimal fine less than maximal (equal 
to the harm).  The conclusion follows by a continuity argument. 
23 It also is possible, however, that overdeterrence would be optimal.  The reason is that the imposition of 
risk can be reduced by discouraging individuals from engaging in the harmful activity.  
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  Another advantage of fault-based liability is that it may result in lower enforcement 
expenditures than under strict liability.  Specifically, because fines are not imposed under fault-
based liability, it becomes desirable to use a high (maximal) fine, which allows a relatively low 
probability of detection to be employed. 
Of course, in reality, as we will be discussing below, mistakes may occur under fault-
based liability, resulting in the imposition of risk.  To the extent that risk exists under fault-based 
liability, the main result obtained under strict liability — that fines should not be maximal —
 carries over to fault-based liability.  
 
8.  NONMONETARY SANCTIONS 
  In this section we analyze the optimal probability and magnitude of prison sentences, first 
assuming that individuals are risk neutral, then that they are risk averse, and finally that they are 
risk preferring.  The last case is of particular relevance for imprisonment sanctions, as will be 
explained. 
8.1  The Risk-Neutral Case 
We assume here that d(s) = s, that is, that the disutility of imprisonment rises in 
proportion to the length of the sentence.  This implies that individuals are indifferent between a 
sure sentence of s and an uncertain sentence with a mean of s.  Thus, individuals display a risk-
neutral attitude towards imprisonment sentences. 
Under the strict liability rule, an individual will commit the harmful act if and only if his 
gain exceeds the expected sentence: g > ps.  Social welfare is 
                                                  4 
                                                  I(g – h – p(e)(s + cs))z(g)dg – e. (18) 
                                                    p(e)s 
 
The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize (18) by choosing enforcement expenditures  
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e and the length of the sentence s. 
In this case the optimal sentence is maximal: s* = sM.  As seen above, when the sanction 
is a fine, the optimal sanction is maximal.  This is also true here even though the sanction is 
costly to impose.  To demonstrate that s* = sM, suppose that s is less than sM.  Then s can be 
raised and e lowered so as to keep p(e)s constant.  The behavior of individuals is unaffected 
because p(e)s has not changed.  The social cost of imprisonment also is unaffected because p(e)(s 
+ cs) is constant.  In other words, although the sentence is higher, proportionally fewer 
individuals are imprisoned.  But because enforcement expenditures fall, social welfare rises.  
Hence, the optimal s equals sM.  
The optimal probability of detection is such that the expected prison sentence could lead 
to either underdeterrence or overdeterrence.  This is essentially for the reasons discussed above 
(see section 5) when the probability of detection was fixed at one.  Here, however, there is an 
additional factor favoring underdeterrence, namely that by lowering the probability, enforcement 
resources are saved. 
  Under fault-based liability, first observe that it must be optimal to have compliance with 
the fault standard.  If the expected sentence were less than the standard, so that some individuals 
would choose to violate the standard and bear the expected sentence, then it would be optimal to 
lower the standard to the expected sentence.  For then, the behavior of individuals would be the 
same, but the cost of imprisonment would be avoided. 
  Next observe that the expected sentence must equal the standard, rather than be higher.  
Otherwise, the probability of detection could be lowered without affecting behavior, but 
enforcement costs would be saved. 
  It is clear, too, that the optimal sentence must be maximal.  This is for the now familiar 
reason that, otherwise, the sentence could be raised and the probability of detection lowered  
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proportionally, without affecting behavior, but saving enforcement expenditures (imprisonment 
costs are zero because of compliance with the standard).
24  Given s* = sM, the optimal probability 
satisfies p(e)sM = g
^ because of our observation in the previous paragraph. 
  The optimal standard g
^* is less than the harm h; in other words, there is some 
underdeterrence.  This is true for a reason already discussed: by lowering the standard, 
enforcement costs are saved, but there is no first-order effect on social welfare due to more 
individuals committing the harmful act because their gain equals the harm. 
Finally, as we previously emphasized, fault-based liability possesses the advantage over 
strict liability that costly sanctions are not actually imposed (in the absence of mistakes).  
Moreover, because the optimal sentence is maximal for this reason, a low probability of 
detection can be used. 
  8.2  The Risk-Averse Case 
We assume now that the disutility of the sentence d(s) rises more than in proportion to the 
sentence.  This could occur because of an increasing desire of a prisoner to join the outside world 
or a growing distaste for the prison environment as time in jail increases.  This assumption 
implies that individuals prefer a sure sentence of s to an uncertain sentence with a mean of s.  In 
other words, individuals are risk-averse in imprisonment sentences.   
Under the strict liability rule, an individual will commit the harmful act if and only if his 
gain exceeds the expected disutility of the sentence, g > pd(s), and social welfare is 
                                              4 
                                              I(g – h – p(e)(d(s) + cs))z(g)dg – e. (19) 
                                            p(e)s 
 
The optimal sentence is again maximal: s* = sM.  The reasons given in the risk-neutral 
 
24 Note, too, that the expected sentence remains constant, so even if imprisonment costs were borne, they 
would not change. 
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case are reinforced here.  As s is raised and e lowered so as to keep p(e)d(s) and the behavior of 
individuals constant, p declines proportionally more than s rises because of individuals’ risk 
aversion.  In other words, ps declines, which implies that the public cost of imprisonment pcs 
falls.
25  Hence, social welfare rises both because the cost of enforcement declines and the cost of 
imprisonment declines. 
The optimal probability of detection is such that, as in the risk-neutral case, the expected 
prison sentence could lead to underdeterrence or overdeterrence. 
  Under fault-based liability, the results are essentially the same as in the risk-neutral case 
because, if the fault standard is complied with, risk is not borne.  Thus, it is optimal to have 
compliance with the fault standard;  
the expected disutility of the sentence must equal the standard; the optimal sentence is maximal; 
there is some underdeterrence; and fault-based liability is superior to strict liability.  A 
difference, however, is that the probability of detection needed to obtain compliance with the 
fault standard can be lowered because individuals are risk averse. 
  8.3  The Risk-Preferring Case 
Finally, suppose that the disutility of the sentence d(s) rises less than in proportion to the 
sentence.  This could occur because the disutility from the stigma of being in jail might be 
substantial from having spent even a short amount of time there, but not increase much with the 
length of imprisonment.
26  Individuals’ discounting of the future disutility of imprisonment also 
makes earlier years of imprisonment more important than later ones.  The present assumption 
implies that individuals prefer an uncertain sentence with a mean of s to a sure sentence of s; 
 
25 Note the contrast with the case of risk aversion in fines, in which the decline in the expected sanction pf 
meant a decline in revenue to the state and thus an increase in taxes.  Here the decline in the expected sanction ps 
means a decline in expenses to the state and thus a decrease in taxes. 
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individuals are risk-preferring in imprisonment sentences.   
Under the strict liability rule, social welfare is again given by (19).  The optimal sentence, 
however, might be less than maximal: s* # sM.  Now, when the sentence is raised, the probability 
that maintains deterrence cannot be lowered proportionally, implying that the expected prison 
term rises.  Because the resulting increased cost to the public of imposing imprisonment 
sanctions might exceed the savings in enforcement expenditures from lowering the probability, 
the optimal prison term might not be maximal.
27 
  Under fault-based liability, the results are again essentially the same as in the risk-neutral 
case. 
 
9.  COMBINED SANCTIONS 
  Under the strict sanctioning rule, as we explained above, it never is optimal to employ a 
prison sentence unless the fine has been set as high as possible, since fines are socially cheaper 
sanctions.  Whether it is optimal to use a prison sentence in addition to the maximal fine depends 
on the extent of underdeterrence that would result if fines were used alone, and the social cost of 
imprisonment. 
  Under the fault-based sanctioning rule, the key point is that it is always desirable to 
employ the maximal prison sentence in addition to the maximal fine, since neither sanction is 
actually imposed.  By using maximal sanctions, the probability of detection can be set at a low 
level, thereby saving enforcement costs. 
 
 
26 Also, the first years of imprisonment may create special disutility due to brutalization of the prisoner. 
27 The results in this section were first presented by Polinsky and Shavell (1999) (although Shavell (1991b) 
notes the result in the case of risk neutrality).  
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C.  BASIC THEORY SUMMARIZED AND COMPARED TO PRACTICE 
10.  SUMMARY OF THE BASIC THEORY 
In this section we summarize the main points from parts A and B: 
(a)  When the probability of detection of a harmful act is taken as fixed and individuals 
are risk neutral, the optimal fine is the harm divided by the probability of detection, for this 
results in an expected fine equal to the harm.  However, the risk aversion of individuals tends to 
lower the level of the optimal fine. 
(b)  When the probability of detection can be varied, relatively high sanctions may be 
optimal, for this allows a relatively low probability to be employed and thereby saves 
enforcement costs.  Indeed, the optimal fine is maximal if individuals are risk neutral in wealth, 
and the optimal imprisonment term is maximal if individuals are risk neutral or risk averse in 
imprisonment.  Optimal sanctions might not be maximal, however, when individuals are risk 
averse in wealth or risk preferring in imprisonment, both plausible assumptions, although the 
motive to set sanctions at relatively high levels in order to reduce enforcement costs still 
applies.
28 
(c)  Optimal enforcement tends to be characterized by some degree of underdeterrence 
relative to first-best behavior, because allowing underdeterrence conserves enforcement 
resources.  More precisely, by lowering the probability of detection slightly from a level that 
would lead to first-best behavior, the state reduces enforcement costs, and although more 
individuals commit the harmful act, these individuals do not cause social welfare to decline 
substantially because their gains are approximately equal to the harm. 
 
28 There are other reasons why optimal sanctions might not be maximal.  See, for example, the discussion 
of general enforcement in section 17.  
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(d)  The use of fines should be exhausted before resort is made to the costlier sanction of 
imprisonment. 
(e)  An advantage of fault-based liability over strict liability is that sanctions that are 
costly to impose — imprisonment, and fines when individuals are risk averse — are imposed less 
often under the former rule.  Under fault-based liability, individuals generally are induced (in the 
absence of mistakes) to obey fault standards, and therefore ordinarily do not bear sanctions.  
Under strict liability, however, individuals who cause harm are sanctioned whenever they are 
caught. 
(f)  An advantage of strict liability over fault-based liability is that the former is easier to 
apply.  Strict liability requires the state to determine only the harm done, whereas fault-based 
liability requires the state to ascertain optimal behavior (in order to set the fault standard) and to 
observe actual behavior (in order to apply the standard). 
 
11.  THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE 
Having reviewed the basic theory of public enforcement of law, we briefly comment on 
the relationship between optimal enforcement and enforcement in practice. 
First observe that important features of actual public law enforcement are congruent, at 
least in a broad sense, with what is theoretically desirable.  Public enforcement is often 
characterized by low probabilities of detection.  This is true for many criminal acts, and also is 
frequently the case in other spheres of public enforcement, such as traffic control and tax 
collection.
29  That probabilities of detection are low undoubtedly reflects the cost of raising the 
 
29 U.S. Department of Justice (1997b, p. 205, table 25) indicates, for example, that the likelihood of arrest 
was 13.8% for burglary, 14.0% for automobile theft, and 16.5% for arson.  Kenkel (1993, p. 145) estimates that the 
probability of arrest for drunk driving is “only about .003.”  And according to Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 820), the 
audit rate for individual tax returns was 1.7 percent in 1995.  
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probability, a central factor in our discussion. 
Corresponding to the low probabilities of detection are relatively high sanctions, often 
exceeding harm.  For example, it seems that the sentence for theft typically outweighs the harm 
from that act, that the penalty for double parking frequently surpasses the resulting congestion 
costs, and that the sanction for tax evasion tends to exceed the social losses thereby created.  
Sanctions that are in excess of harm are needed for proper deterrence when the probabilities of 
enforcement are less than one, as they are in these examples. 
The theory of optimal public enforcement of law also helps to explain why society uses 
the sanction of imprisonment when it does — for the category of harmful acts labeled criminal, 
notably, for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and so forth.
30  Because such acts cause substantial 
harm, yet often are detected with a low probability, the magnitudes of desirable penalties are 
high.  If these penalties were solely monetary, they often would exceed the assets of the 
individuals who commit the acts, for individuals who commit crimes tend to have very low 
assets.
31  Imprisonment sanctions, therefore, usually will be required to maintain an adequate 
level of deterrence of acts classified as criminal.
32  
Note, too, that the standard of liability when imprisonment sanctions are imposed is 
generally fault-based — imprisonment is premised on  the nature of the wrongful act, not merely 
on the fact that harm was done.  This is socially desirable because, as we stressed, fault-based 
 
30 See generally Posner (1985, pp. 1201-1205), Shavell (1985, pp. 1236-1241), and Shavell (2004, pp. 543-
568). 
31 For example, in U.S. Department of Justice (1988, p. 35) it is reported that “the average inmate was at 
the poverty level before entering jail” and in U.S. Department of Justice (1998, p. 4) it is stated that almost half of 
jail inmates reported incomes of less than $600 a month in the month before their most recent arrest. 
32 The use of imprisonment sanctions also makes sense in view of their incapacitative function: crimes 
cause substantial harm and may be difficult or expensive to deter (for the reason we just emphasized, as well as 
others), so that it often will be desirable to incapacitate individuals who have committed them.  See section 25. 
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liability reduces the use of socially costly sanctions.  
Although actual public enforcement is consistent in many respects with the theory of 
optimal enforcement, actual enforcement also appears to deviate in various ways from what is 
theoretically desirable.  We note two discrepancies of general importance.  First, substantial 
enforcement costs could be saved without sacrificing deterrence by reducing enforcement effort 
and simultaneously raising fines.  This is possible in many enforcement contexts because fines 
are presently very low relative to the assets of violators.  For example, fines for most parking 
violations are less than $50, penalties for underpayment of income taxes are typically on the 
order of 20% of the amount not paid, and fines for corporate violations of health and safety 
regulations are frequently minuscule in relation to corporate assets.  In such areas of 
enforcement, therefore, fines could readily be, say, doubled and enforcement costs reduced 
significantly, while maintaining deterrence at present levels. 
Not only can present levels of deterrence be achieved more cheaply, it also seems that 
these levels are often too low.  This is a reasonable supposition given the limited use of fines that 
we just noted and the low probabilities of their application.  For example, the probability of a tax 
audit is approximately 2%; when combined with the modest penalties for underpayment, one 
would predict substantial tax avoidance.
33  Evidence also suggests that the expected fine for 
driving while intoxicated is on the order of one-quarter of the expected harm caused by such 
behavior,
34 and that monetary sanctions imposed on corporations equal on average only thirty-
 
33 In 1995 the audit rate for individual returns was 1.7 percent, as noted above, and the civil penalty for 
underpayment of taxes ordinarily is calculated as 20 percent of the underpayment that results from wrongful conduct 
(such as substantially misstating a valuation).  See Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 820).  Thus, for every dollar of 
underpayment, the expected payment, including the underpayment and the civil penalty, is only approximately $0.02 
(= .017 x $1.20). 
34 See Kenkel (1993, p. 145).  The expected fine is $12.82 and the expected harm is $47.77 (both in 1986 
dollars).  While the latter number may seem low, keep in mind that it is the product of the probability that a harm 
will occur as a result of drunken driving, and the level of harm if harm does occur.  (To properly determine whether  
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three percent of the harms caused.
35  Given the ample opportunities that exist for augmenting 
penalties, as well as the possible desirability of increasing enforcement effort, society probably 
should raise levels of deterrence in many areas of enforcement. 
 
D.  EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC THEORY 
This concludes the presentation of the basic theory of public enforcement of law.  We 
now turn to various extensions and refinements of the basic analysis. 
 
12.  ACCIDENTAL HARMS 
In our analysis above, we implicitly assumed that the acts that individuals commit result 
in harm with certainty.  In many circumstances, of course, acts result in harm only with a 
probability.  A driver that speeds only creates a likelihood of a collision; or a firm that stores 
toxic chemicals in a substandard tank only creates a probability of a harmful spill. 
Essentially all of the results in the basic analysis carry over in a straightforward way 
when harms are accidental.  If individuals are risk neutral, sanctions are monetary, and the 
expected sanction equals harm whenever harm turns out to occur, then induced behavior will still 
be socially optimal; further, the optimal magnitude of sanctions is maximal if individuals are risk 
neutral because this allows enforcement costs to be saved, but is not necessarily maximal if 
individuals are risk averse, and so forth.  Our general conclusions in the basic analysis can thus 
be interpreted to apply both when harms occur for sure and when harms occur accidentally. 
 
dangerous driving is underdeterred, one also would have to take into account the threat of liability from private suits 
brought by accident victims.  But the deterrent effect of such suits will be dulled to the extent that drivers do not 
have sufficient assets to pay for the harms suffered by accident victims, or have liability insurance and therefore 
only partially bear the financial consequences of a lawsuit.) 
35 See Cohen (1989, pp. 617-618, 658).  Cohen notes, however, that he did not take into account other 
sanctions imposed on corporate criminals, including restitution, civil penalties, and private tort suits.  
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There is, however, a new issue that arises when harm is uncertain: a sanction can be 
imposed either on the basis of the commission of a dangerous act that increases the chance of 
harm — storing chemicals in a substandard tank — or on the basis of the actual occurrence of 
harm — only if the tank ruptures and results in a spill.  In principle, either approach can be 
employed to achieve optimal deterrence.  To illustrate, suppose that the substandard tank has a 
10% chance of rupturing, in which case the harm would be $10 million; the expected harm from 
using the tank therefore is $1 million.  If individuals are risk neutral and sanctions are imposed 
only when harm occurs, deterrence will be optimal if, as usual, the sanction equals the harm of 
$10 million.  Alternatively, if sanctions are imposed on the basis of the dangerous act of using 
the substandard tank, deterrence will be optimal if the owner of the tank faces a sanction equal to 
the expected harm due to his use of the substandard tank, $1 million. 
Several factors are relevant to the choice between act-based and harm-based sanctions.  
First, act-based sanctions need not be as high to accomplish a given level of deterrence, and thus 
offer an advantage over harm-based sanctions because of limitations in parties’ assets.  In the 
example in the preceding paragraph, the owner of the storage tank might be able to pay the 
$1 million required if sanctions are act-based (assuming for simplicity that individuals are 
always found liable) but not the $10 million required if sanctions are harm-based.  Second, and 
closely related, because act-based sanctions need not be as high to accomplish deterrence, they 
tend to be preferable to harm-based sanctions when parties are risk averse.  Third, act-based 
sanctions and harm-based sanctions may differ in the ease with which they can be applied.  In 
some circumstances, act-based sanctions may be simpler to impose (it might be less difficult to 
determine whether an oil shipper properly maintains its vessels’ holding tanks than to detect 
whether one of the vessels leaked oil into the ocean); in other circumstances, harm-based 
sanctions may be more readily applied (a driver who causes an accident might be caught more  
 
 
- 31 - 
                                                
easily than one who speeds but does not cause an accident).  Fourth, it may be hard to calculate 
the expected harm due to an act, but relatively easy to ascertain the actual harm if it eventuates; 
if so, this constitutes an advantage of harm-based liability.
36  
 
13.  PRECAUTIONS 
In this section we consider a model in which harm is accidental, as in the previous 
section, and in which the probability of harm depends on the level of precautions taken by a 
potential injurer.  Thus, the major difference from the basic model considered in earlier sections 
is that the act is continuously variable.  The main results of the basic analysis carry over to the 
model of precautions.  For simplicity, we focus on the case in which enforcement is certain.  Let 
         x = level of precautions taken by a potential injurer; and 
    q(x) = probability of harm given x; qN(x) < 0; qO(x) > 0. 
The usual social objective of maximizing social welfare now can be expressed as 
minimizing social costs, that is, minimizing the sum of the cost of precautions and the expected 
harm: x + q(x)h.  Let x* > 0 be the solution to this problem. 
  First consider strict liability when the sanction is a fine equal to the harm.  Then an 
individual’s problem is to minimize x +q(x)h, so he will choose x* (and obviously would not if 
the fine did not equal harm). 
  Next consider fault-based liability when the standard corresponds to x* and the sanction 
is a fine equal to harm.  If an individual takes less precaution than x*, he bears costs of x + q(x)h, 
while if he takes precaution equal to or greater than x*, he bears cost of x.  It is straightforward to 
 
36 Act-based versus harm-based enforcement is discussed in Shavell (1993).  
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show that he will exercise precautions equal to x*.
37   
  Thus, as in the basic theory, strict liability and fault-based liability result in the first-best 
outcome when sanctions are monetary and are applied for sure.  Similar reasoning would 
demonstrate that all of the other primary conclusions in the basic theory would carry over to the 
model of precautions. 
  To illustrate, reconsider the case when individuals are risk neutral, liability is strict, and 
the sanction is a fine.  Social costs are x + q(x)h + e.  The level of precautions x is determined by 
the individual minimizing x + q(x)p(e)f.  Again, the optimal fine must be the individual’s wealth 
w (otherwise, f could be raised and e lowered without affecting deterrence) and the optimal p is 
such that pw < h.
38  Therefore, at the optimum, the level of precautions is less than the first-best 
level.  
 
14.  ACTIVITY LEVEL 
We have been assuming that the sole decision that an individual makes is whether to act 
in a way that causes harm when engaging in some activity.  In many contexts, however, an 
individual also makes a choice about his activity level — that is, not only does he choose whether 
to act in a harmful way while engaging in an activity, he also chooses whether to engage in that 
activity, or, more generally, at what level to do so.   For example, in addition to deciding whether 
to comply with auto emissions controls (maintaining a catalytic converter), an individual also 
 
37 Conditional on choosing x $ x*, his best choice clearly is x*, as that minimizes his expense, which is x*.  
If he chooses x < x*, his expense is x + q(x)h, which exceeds x* + q(x*)h > x*.  Hence, x* is strictly optimal for 
him.   
 
38 Let x(e) be the x determined by the individual’s optimization problem, given f = w and enforcement 
expenditures e.  The individual minimizes x + q(x)p(e)w, with the resulting first-order condition 1 + qNp(e)w = 0.  
The social problem is to minimize x(e) + q(x(e))h + e.  The first-order condition can be written as xN(1 + qNh) + 1 = 
0.  We know that xN > 0.  Therefore, it must be that 1 + qNh < 0.  Solving for qN from the individual’s first-order 
condition and substituting it into this expression implies that pw < h.  
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chooses how many miles to drive; the number of miles driven is the individual’s level of activity. 
 Similarly, not only does a firm decide whether to comply with workplace safety regulations, it 
also chooses its level of production; the output of the firm is its level of activity. 
The socially optimal activity level is such that the individual’s marginal utility from the 
activity just equals the marginal expected harm caused by the activity.  Thus, the optimal number 
of miles driven is the level at which the marginal utility of driving an extra mile just equals the 
marginal expected harm per mile driven.  The determination of the optimal level of activity 
presumes that individuals act optimally when engaging in the activity — for example, that they 
drive with appropriate care. 
To illustrate this formally, let 
         r = level of activity; and 
    U(r) = utility from activity level r; UN(r) > 0; UO(r) < 0. 
We suppose that an individual chooses how much precaution to take (see the previous section) 
while engaging in a harm-creating activity, with the level of harm being proportional to his level 
of activity.
39  Then social welfare is  
                                                            U(r) – r[x + q(x)h]. (20) 
Note that the optimal level of precaution x* minimizes x + q(x)h, and thus is as discussed in 
section 13.  The optimal level of activity therefore is determined by  
                                                            UN(r) = x* + q(x*)h; (21) 
that is, the marginal utility from the activity equals the social cost of the activity, which is the 
sum of the cost of precautions and the expected harm. 
 
  
39 We are employing the model of precautions described in the previous section for convenience.  It also 
would be possible to develop the points about activity level using the model from the basic analysis, in which the 
harm-producing action of an individual is not continuously variable.  
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Will parties’ choices about their activity levels and precautions be socially correct under 
the two standards for imposing sanctions?  The answer is that under strict liability, their choices 
about both activity levels and precautions will be socially correct.  This is clear since, assuming 
for simplicity that enforcement is certain and the sanction is a fine equal to harm, their objective 
also is to maximize (20).  In particular, because they bear a fine equal to harm, they choose the 
optimal level of precautions x* when engaging in their activity.  And since they incur the full 
social costs of precautions plus expected harm when engaging in their activity, they choose the 
optimal level of activity. 
Under the fault-based standard, however, parties will participate in activities to a socially 
excessive extent.  To explain, observe that parties choose the optimal level of precautions x* in 
order to avoid the fine, as seen in section 13.  Because parties choose this level of precautions, 
they will not be found liable for having violated the standard if harm occurs.  Hence, their choice 
of activity level r is determined by maximizing U(r) – rx*, with the corresponding first-order 
condition 
                                                                    UN(r) = x*. (22) 
Comparing this to (21), it is evident that r exceeds r*.  The reason is that the private marginal 
cost of increasing participation in the activity is only the precaution cost x*; it does not include 
the expected harm.  Thus, for instance, if a person complies with auto emissions standards, he 
will not be concerned with the fact that the more he drives, the more pollution he causes 
(assuming that some pollution occurs even if one obeys emissions standards).  Consequently, he 
will drive too much. 
The implication of the preceding points in relation to firms is that under the strict 
sanctioning rule, the product price will reflect both the cost of precautions and the expected harm 
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caused by production, so that the price will include the full social cost of production.  Hence, the 
amount purchased, and thus the level of production, will be socially optimal.  Under the fault-
based rule, however, the product price will reflect the cost of precautions but not expected harm; 
thus, the amount sold, and the level of production, will be excessive.
40 
These conclusions about firms are of widespread applicability.  Notably, safety 
regulations and other regulatory requirements are often framed as standards of care that have to 
be met, but which, if met, free the regulated party from penalties.  Hence, regulations of this 
character are subject to the criticism that they lead to excessive levels of the regulated activity.  
Making firms strictly liable for harm would be superior to safety regulation with respect to 
inducing socially correct activity levels. 
That parties choose an excessive level of activity under the fault-based rule — of which 
regulation is one variant — but not under the strict liability rule, constitutes a fundamental 
advantage of the latter rule.   This advantage is stronger the greater is the harm from engaging in 
the activity (given that precautions are optimal when engaging in the activity).  Thus, for 
activities for which expected harm is likely to be substantial, the disadvantage of the fault-based 
standard is significant.  
More generally, the advantage of strict liability over fault-based liability applies to any 
dimension of behavior that affects expected harm but that is not included in the definition of 
fault.  For example, suppose that pollution damage depends both on whether a scrubber is 
installed as well as on the degree of care with which it is cleaned.  Because the existence of a 
scrubber is easy to verify but its maintenance might not be, a fault-based sanctioning system 
 
40 Our discussion here about activity-level considerations in the context of public enforcement closely 
parallels the analysis of activity-level issues in the context of tort liability.  See generally Shavell (1980) and 
Polinsky (1980b).  
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might, of necessity, reflect only the first dimension of behavior.  Consequently, the firm will 
have a socially inadequate incentive to clean the scrubber under a fault standard.  This problem 
does not arise under a strict sanctioning system because the firm has to pay for harm regardless 
of its cause. 
 
15.  ERRORS 
Errors of the two classic types can occur in public enforcement of law.  First, an 
individual who should be found liable might mistakenly not be found liable — what we will refer 
to as “mistaken acquittal.”  Second, an individual who should not be found liable might 
mistakenly be found liable — “mistaken conviction.”  For an individual who has been detected, 
let 
        εA = the probability of mistaken acquittal; and 
        εC = the probability of mistaken conviction. 
For example, suppose police randomly monitor drivers by stopping them and administering a 
blood-alcohol test.  The test might understate the amount of alcohol in the driver’s blood and 
result in mistaken acquittal, or overstate the amount and lead to mistaken conviction. 
We initially consider the effect of mistake in the basic model of enforcement, assuming 
that the sanctioning standard is strict, the sanction is a fine, and individuals are risk neutral.  
Given the probability of detection p and the chances of mistaken acquittal and conviction, an 
individual will commit the wrongful act if and only if his gain net of his expected fine if he does 
commit it exceeds what he bears if he does not commit it: 
  g – p(1 – εA)f > –pεCf, (23)  
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or, equivalently, if and only if
41  
  g > (1 – εA – εC)pf. (24) 
Note initially that both types of error reduce deterrence: the right-hand side of (24) is declining in 
both εA and εC.  Mistaken acquittal diminishes deterrence because it lowers the expected fine if 
an individual violates the law.  Mistaken conviction also lowers deterrence because it reduces the 
difference between the expected fine from violating the law and not violating it.  In other words, 
the greater is εC, the smaller the increase in the expected fine if one violates the law, making a 
violation less costly to the individual.
42 
Because mistakes dilute deterrence, they tend to reduce social welfare.  Specifically, to 
achieve any level of deterrence, it may be necessary to raise the probability of detection or the 
magnitude of a costly sanction to offset the effect of errors. 
Now consider the optimal choice of the fine.  If the probability of detection is assumed to 
be fixed, the dilution in deterrence caused by errors requires a higher fine to restore deterrence, 
so the optimal fine is higher.
43  If both the probability and the fine are policy instruments, the 
optimal fine remains maximal despite mistakes.  The explanation is essentially that given 
previously: If the fine f were less than maximal, then f could be raised and the probability p 
lowered so as to keep deterrence constant, but saving enforcement costs. 
If individuals are risk averse, however, the possibility of mistakes does affect the optimal 
fine.  As we emphasized in section 7.2, the optimal fine generally is less than maximal when 
individuals are risk averse — lowering the fine reduces the bearing of risk.  Introducing the 
 
41 We assume that 1 – εA – εC > 0, so that the probability that a guilty person will be found liable, 1 – εA, 
exceeds the probability that an innocent person will be found liable, εC. 
42 This point was first emphasized by Png (1986). 
43 Specifically, to achieve first-best behavior, it must be that (1 – εA – εC)pf = h, which implies that f must be 
higher the greater are either of the errors, εA or εC.  
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possibility of mistakes may increase the desirability of lowering the fine because, due to 
mistaken conviction, individuals who do not violate the law are subject to the risk of having to 
pay a fine.  Indeed, because the number of persons who do not violate the law often would far 
exceed the number who do, the desire to avoid imposing risk on the former group can lead to a 
substantial reduction in the optimal fine.
44  
The possibility of mistakes generally affects the optimal probability of detection.  On one 
hand, the deterrence-diluting effects of mistakes means, as we noted, that a higher probability of 
detection may be needed to achieve any given level of deterrence; this effect tends to raise the 
optimal expenditure on enforcement.  On the other hand,  because mistakes reduce the 
productivity of enforcement expenditures by a factor of 1 – εA – εC (see (24)), the cost of 
achieving a given level of deterrence is higher; this effect tends to reduce the optimal 
expenditure on enforcement.  Either of these effects could dominate and lead to an optimal 
probability of detection that is higher or lower than in the absence of mistakes.  
Next, consider imprisonment and mistake.  As in the case of fines, mistakes of both type 
dilute the deterrent effect of imprisonment.  Additionally, as in the case without mistakes, the 
optimal imprisonment term is maximal if individuals are risk neutral or risk averse in 
imprisonment, but is generally not maximal if they are risk preferring in imprisonment.
45 
The possibility of mistakes also affects individuals’ decisions regarding their 
participation in activities.  Everything else equal, mistaken acquittals lead to increased 
 
44 Building on Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Block and Sidak (1980, pp. 1135-1139) emphasize the 
desirability of lowering sanctions on risk-averse individuals because of mistakes. 
45 That the optimal term remains maximal if individuals are risk neutral or risk averse might seem 
surprising because one might expect that the chance of mistaken conviction would result in a lower optimal term.  
But the usual argument still applies: If the term were not maximal, it could be raised and the probability of detection 
could be lowered at least proportionally without sacrificing deterrence.  Hence, the aggregate amount of jail time 
served by individuals who do not commit the harmful act would remain the same or fall, and enforcement 
expenditures would decline.  
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engagement in the activity, and mistaken convictions result in decreased engagement.  The net 
effect could be a socially excessive or inadequate activity level.
46 
We have not yet commented on fault-based liability and mistake.  In this context, an 
important implication of mistake is that some individuals will bear sanctions even if they comply 
with the fault standard.  Consequently, both types of error reduce the incentive to comply with 
the fault standard in the basic model, for essentially the same reasons as under strict liability. 
However, in the model with variable precautions, there is a possibility that error will lead 
to an excessive level of precautions — above the optimal level. Assume that the actual level of 
precautions x is observed with an error ε.  If the observed level of precautions, x + ε, exceeds the 
standard x G, the person will not be liable because he will not be found to be at fault.  But if x + ε is 
less than x G, then the person will be liable.  The person will be found mistakenly liable if x is 
greater than or equal to x G but x + ε is less than x G; the person will be mistakenly acquitted if x is 
less than x G but x + ε equals or exceeds x G.  Note that the probabilities of the two types of error 
depend on the person’s choice of x.  By choosing an x above x G, the person can reduce the risk of 
mistaken conviction, and it can be shown that he will be led to choose such an excessive x under 
fairly general conditions.  In other words, individuals will often have a motive to take excessive 
precautions in order to reduce the chance of erroneously being found at fault.
47 
Errors also influence individuals’ participation in the activity under fault-based liability, 
similar to the effects of errors under strict liability.  The main difference is that there is a general 
tendency for individuals to participate in the activity to an excessive extent under fault-based 
 
46 Recall, too, that if the probability of detection is fixed, the fine needs to be raised to offset the deterrence-
diluting effects of mistakes.  Raising the fine to this extent, however, leads to an inadequate incentive to engage in 
the activity.  This problem, in turn, can be remedied by use of an appropriate subsidy for participating in the activity. 
 For the details behind this point, see Png (1986). 
 
47 This point was first emphasized by Craswell and Calfee (1986).  
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liability, for the reason explained in the previous section.  Only if the chance of mistaken 
conviction is sufficiently high would this conclusion be reversed. 
Finally, observe that the probabilities of error can be influenced by policy choices.   For 
example, prosecutorial resources can be increased in order to reduce the probability of mistaken 
acquittal, or the standard of proof can be raised to reduce the chance of mistaken conviction 
(although this presumably increases the likelihood of mistaken acquittal).  Because the reduction 
of both types of error increase deterrence, expenditures made to reduce errors may be socially 
beneficial.
48  
 
16.  COSTS OF IMPOSING FINES 
We inquire in this section about the implications of costs borne by enforcement 
authorities in imposing fines.
49  Our principal observation is that such costs should raise the level 
of the fine. 
To elaborate, suppose that the probability of detection is fixed at p, that liability is strict, 
and that individuals are risk neutral.  If fines are costless to impose, the optimal fine is h/p, the 
harm divided by the probability of detection (see (14)).  Now suppose that the enforcement 
authority bears a cost each time a fine is imposed; let 
         k = cost of imposing a fine on an offender. 
It is easy to verify that the optimal fine then is 
  f* = h/p + k; (25) 
the cost k should be added to the fine that would otherwise be desirable.  The explanation is that, 
 
48 On the value of accuracy in adjudication, see Kaplow and Shavell (1994a). 
49 We have already discussed the cost of imposing imprisonment sanctions — specifically, the cost to the 
state per unit of the imprisonment term, c.  
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if an individual commits a harmful act, he causes society to bear not only the immediate harm h, 
but also, with probability p, the cost k of imposing the fine — that is, his act results in an 
expected total social cost of h + pk.  If the fine is set according to (25), the individual’s expected 
fine is h + pk, which leads him to engage in the harmful act if and only if his gain exceeds the 
expected total social cost of the act. 
There may be other costs associated with the imposition of fines.  In particular, suppose 
that detection is followed by a costly second stage during which the state investigates and 
prosecutes an individual, and at the end of which a fine is imposed only with a probability.  Let 
         s = cost of the investigation-prosecution stage; and 
           q  = probability of a fine being imposed after the investigation-prosecution stage. 
Hence, the probability that an individual will have to pay a fine is pq and the expected costs of 
imposing a fine, including the expected investigation-prosecution cost, become ps + pqk. 
It is readily shown that the optimal fine now is 
  f* = h/pq + s/q + k. (26) 
This formula illustrates a general principle: the optimal fine equals the costs incurred by society 
as a result of the harmful act divided by the probability — at the time that each component of 
cost is incurred — that the individual will have to pay the fine.  Thus, h is divided by pq because, 
when the harm occurs, the probability of having to pay the fine is pq; and s is divided by q 
because, when the investigation-prosecution costs are incurred, the probability of having to pay 
the fine is q.  If the fine is computed according to this principle, the expected fine will equal the 
expected social costs due to an individual committing a harmful act, including the harm caused 
and the expected sanctioning costs — that is, h + ps + pqk. 
Note that under fault-based liability, the costs of imposing fines is significantly lower, if 
not zero.  This is because, if individuals comply with the fault standard, they do not bear  
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sanctions, in which case there are no costs associated with imposing sanctions.  However, if 
individuals are found at fault (say because of errors), the fines imposed on them also should 
reflect the costs of imposing fines. 
Finally, observe that not only does the state incur costs when fines are imposed, so do the 
individuals who pay the fines (such as legal defense expenses).  The costs borne by individuals, 
however, do not affect the formula for the optimal fine.  Individuals properly take these costs 
into account because they bear them directly.
50  
 
17.  GENERAL ENFORCEMENT 
In many settings, enforcement may be said to be general in the sense that several 
different types of violations may be detected by an enforcement agent’s activity.  For example, a 
police officer waiting along the side of a road may notice a driver who litters as well as a driver 
who goes through a red light or who speeds; or a tax auditor may detect a variety of infractions 
when he examines a tax return.  To analyze this type of situation, suppose that a single 
probability of detection applies to all harmful acts, regardless of the magnitude of the harm.
51  
(The contrasting assumption is that enforcement is specific, meaning that the probability is 
chosen independently for each type of harmful act.) 
The main point that we want to make is that when enforcement is general, the optimal 
sanction rises with the severity of the harm and is maximal only for relatively high harms.  To 
see this, assume that liability is strict, the sanction is a fine, and individuals are risk neutral.  Let 
 
50 The points developed in this section were first presented in Polinsky and Shavell (1992), although early 
writers on enforcement theory — including Becker (1968, p. 192) and Stigler (1970, p. 533) — recognized that 
sanctions should reflect enforcement costs. 
51 It will be clear that the main point developed in this section does not depend on the assumption that the 
same probability applies to all acts.  The only requirement is that the probabilities for different acts are linked, all a 
function of the same enforcement expenditure.  
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f(h) be the fine given harm h.  Then, for any general probability of detection p, the optimal fine 
schedule is 
  f*(h) = h/p, (27) 
provided that h/p does not exceed the maximum feasible fine (say individuals’ wealth level w); if 
h/p is not feasible, the optimal fine is maximal.  This schedule is obviously optimal given p 
because it implies that the expected fine equals harm, thereby inducing first-best behavior, 
whenever that is possible. 
The question remains whether it would be desirable to lower p and raise fines to the 
maximal level for the low-harm acts for which f*(h) is less than maximal.  But if p is reduced for 
the relatively low-harm acts (and the fine raised for them), then p — being general — is also 
reduced for the high-harm acts for which the fine is already maximal, resulting in lower 
deterrence of these acts.  The decline in deterrence of high-harm acts may cause a greater social 
loss than the savings in enforcement costs from lowering p.  To express this point differently, p 
must be sufficiently high to avoid significant underdeterrence of high-harm acts (for which fines 
are maximal).  But since this p also applies to less harmful acts, the fines for them do not need to 
be maximal in order to deter them appropriately.
52  
The result that, when enforcement is general, sanctions should rise with the severity of 
harm up to a maximum also holds if the sanction is imprisonment and if liability is fault-based.  
The underlying reasoning is the same as that given above.
53  
 
 
52 Note that if p could be varied independently for a low-harm act and for a high-harm act — that is, if 
enforcement is specific rather than general — then it would be desirable to lower p and raise the fine for a low-harm 
act if the fine for it were less than maximal. 
53 The basic point of this section was first made by Shavell (1991b); see also Mookherjee and Png (1992) 
for a closely related analysis.  
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18.  MARGINAL DETERRENCE 
In many circumstances, an individual may consider which of several harmful acts to 
commit, for example, whether to release only a small amount of a pollutant into a river or a large 
amount, or whether only to kidnap a person or also to kill him.  In such contexts, the threat of 
sanctions plays a role in addition to the usual one of deterring individuals from committing 
harmful acts: for individuals who are not deterred, expected sanctions influence which harmful 
acts individuals choose to commit.  Notably, such individuals will have a reason to commit less 
harmful rather than more harmful acts if expected sanctions rise with harm.  Deterring a more 
harmful act by having its expected sanction exceed that for a less harmful act is sometimes 
referred to as marginal deterrence.
54 
Other things being equal, it is socially desirable that enforcement policy creates marginal 
deterrence, so that those who are not deterred from committing harmful acts have a reason to 
moderate the amount of harm that they cause.  This suggests that sanctions should rise with the 
magnitude of harm and, therefore, that most sanctions should be less than maximal.  However, 
promoting marginal deterrence may conflict with achieving deterrence generally: for the 
schedule of sanctions to rise steeply enough to accomplish marginal deterrence, sanctions for less 
harmful acts might have to be so low that individuals are inadequately deterred from committing 
these acts.
55 
  To illustrate the implications of marginal deterrence, consider the following example in 
which sanctions are monetary and liability is strict.  Suppose that there are two harmful acts, with 
 
54 The notion of marginal deterrence was remarked upon in some of the earliest writing on enforcement; see 
Beccaria (1767, p. 32) and Bentham (1789, p. 171).  The term marginal deterrence apparently was first used by 
Stigler (1970).   
55 For formal treatments of marginal deterrence, see Shavell (1992), Wilde (1992), and Mookherjee and 
Png (1994).  
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harms h1 and h2, where h1 < h2, that the probability of detection p is the same for both acts, and 
that individuals have the same level of wealth w.  We will first consider a one-act model in 
which there can be no marginal deterrence because each individual can commit only one type of 
harmful act.  We will then compare the results in this case to a two-act model in which each 
individual can commit either of two harmful acts. 
  In the one-act model, suppose some individuals have the opportunity to commit an act 
causing harm of h1 and other individuals have the opportunity to commit an act causing harm of 
h2.  It is optimal to set the fine for the high-harm act equal to w, for otherwise it would be 
possible to raise the fine for both acts and lower the probability of detection p without affecting 
deterrence, but saving enforcement costs.  It also follows that the optimal p is such that pw is less 
than h2, that is, there is some underdeterrence of the high-harm act.  The reason is that if pw = h2, 
there would be no first-order loss of social welfare in terms of gains and harm if p is lowered 
(since marginal individuals are those for whom g = h2), but enforcement costs would be saved.  
Given the common probability p, the fine f1 for the lesser offense then can be set such that pf1 = 
h1 (assuming such a fine is feasible), achieving first-best deterrence of this offense. 
  In the two-act model, each individual can commit an act causing harm of h1 or an act 
causing harm of h2.  Again, it is optimal to set the fine for the high-harm act equal to w and for 
there to be underdeterrence of the high-harm act.  Now, however, f1 should be such that pf1 is 
less than h1, instead of equaling h1.  The essential reason for this result is that the reduction in f1 
from h1/p leads some offenders to commit the act causing harm h1 instead of the act causing 
higher harm h2.  This can be shown to raise social welfare even though the reduction in f1 leads 
some individuals to commit the low-harm act who otherwise would not have committed either  
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harmful act.
56  In other words, achieving marginal deterrence by reducing the expected fine for 
the low-harm act raises social welfare. 
  Two additional observations should be made about marginal deterrence.  First, marginal 
deterrence can be promoted by increasing the probability of detection as well as the magnitude of 
sanctions for acts that cause greater harm.  For example, kidnappers can be deterred more from 
killing their victims if greater police resources are devoted to apprehending kidnappers who 
murder their victims than to those who do not.  (Note, though, that in circumstances in which 
enforcement is general, the probability of detection cannot be independently altered for acts that 
cause different degrees of harm.)  Second, marginal deterrence is naturally accomplished if the 
expected sanction equals harm for all levels of harm; for if a person is paying for harm done, he 
will have to pay appropriately more if he does greater harm.  Thus, for instance, if a polluter’s 
expected fine would rise from $100 to $500 if he dumps five gallons instead of one gallon of 
waste into a lake, where each gallon causes $100 of harm, his marginal incentives to pollute will 
be correct.
57  
 
19.  PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP 
Although we have assumed that an offender is an independent single actor, in fact the 
offender is often an agent of a principal.  For example, the agent could be an employee of a firm 
 
56 This conclusion essentially follows from two observations.  First, because pw is less than h2, some 
individuals who had been committing the high-harm act were causing a net loss of social welfare (their gain was less 
than h2).  Second, as f1 is lowered marginally from h1/p, individuals who are induced to commit the act causing harm 
h1 (who either would have committed the high-harm act or not committed any harmful act) cause no net loss of 
social welfare (their gain equaled h1). 
 
57 As we discussed in section 7.1, however, it generally is desirable for society to tolerate some 
underdeterrence in order to save enforcement costs, in which case expected sanctions will be less than harm.  Then, 
consideration of marginal deterrence alters the structure of sanctions that would otherwise be best, as the comparison 
of the one-act model to the two-act model in this section showed.  
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or a subcontractor of a contractor.  The enforcement problem is now how to maximize social 
welfare by choosing enforcement effort and the sanctions to be imposed on principals and 
agents.  This maximization is carried out under the assumption that a principal chooses a contract 
with his agent that maximizes the principal’s expected utility subject to two constraints: that the 
agent receive his reservation level of expected utility; and that the agent maximizes his own 
expected utility. 
When harm is caused by an agent, many of our conclusions from the basic analysis carry 
over if the sanction is imposed on the principal.  For example, given the probability of detection 
p, it is optimal for a risk-neutral principal to face a fine of h/p.  Then the expected fine is equal to 
harm done.  Consequently, the principal will behave socially optimally in controlling his agents, 
and in particular will contract with them and monitor them in ways that will give the agents 
socially appropriate incentives to reduce harm.
58  
A question about enforcement that arises when there are principals and agents is how to 
allocate financial sanctions between them.  First observe that the particular allocation of 
sanctions may not matter when, as would be the natural presumption, the principal and the agent 
can reallocate sanctions through their own contract.  For example, if the agent finds that he faces 
a large fine but is more risk averse than the principal, the principal can assume it; conversely, if 
the fine would be imposed on the principal, he can bear that risk and not impose an internal 
sanction on the agent.  Thus, the post-contract penalties that the agent suffers may not be affected 
 
58 There is relatively little literature on the question of optimal enforcement when wrongdoers are agents of 
principals.  Newman and Wright (1990) study the optimal monetary sanction to impose on a risk-neutral principal 
when liability is strict and is imposed for sure; they show that it equals harm.  Polinsky and Shavell (1993) 
demonstrate the potential desirability of imposing criminal sanctions on an employee who causes harm, even when 
the employer is capable of paying for the harm.  Arlen (1994) examines the effect of sanctions on corporations' 
incentives to monitor their employees, and she emphasizes the possibility that corporations may have perverse 
incentives not to monitor if they would become liable as a result of their discovering and reporting employee 
violations.  Also, Shavell (1997b) finds that optimal sanctions on corporations could be above or below harm when 
employee assets are less than harm.  
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by the particular division of sanctions initially selected by the enforcement authority. 
The allocation of monetary sanctions between principals and agents would matter, 
however, if some allocations allow the pair to reduce their total burden.  An important example is 
when a fine is imposed only on the agent and he is unable to pay it because his assets are less 
than the fine.
59  Then he and the principal (who often would have higher assets) would jointly 
escape part of the fine, diluting deterrence.  The fine therefore should be imposed on the 
principal rather than on the agent (or at least the part of the fine that the agent cannot pay). 
A closely related point is that the imposition of imprisonment sanctions on agents may be 
desirable when their assets are less than the optimal fine, even if the principal’s assets are 
sufficient to pay the fine.  The fact that an agent’s assets are limited means that the principal may 
be unable to control him adequately through the use of contractually-determined penalties, which 
can only be monetary.  For example, a firm may not be able, despite the threat of salary 
reduction or dismissal, to induce its employees never to rig bids.  In such circumstances, it may 
be socially valuable to use the threat of personal criminal liability and a jail sentence to better 
control agents’ misconduct.
60  
 
20.  SETTLEMENTS 
We have thus far assumed that when an individual who should be found liable is 
discovered, he will be sanctioned in some automatic fashion.  In practice, however, an individual 
must be found liable in a trial, and before this occurs, it is common for an individual to settle in 
lieu of trial.  (In the criminal context, the settlement usually takes the form of a plea bargain, an 
 
59 See Sykes (1981) and Kornhauser (1982). 
60 This point is discussed by Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) and emphasized by Polinsky and Shavell 
(1993).  
 
 
- 49 - 
                                                
agreement in which the individual pleads guilty to a reduced charge.)   Given the prevalence of 
settlements, it is important to consider how they affect deterrence and the optimal system of 
public enforcement, and whether settlements are socially desirable. 
A general reason why a wrongdoer who has been caught might prefer an out-of-court 
settlement to a trial is that a settlement saves him time and/or money.  Public enforcers 
presumably would prefer settlements for this reason as well.  To amplify, consider a risk-neutral 
detected individual subject to a fine f and let 
         r = probability of conviction; 
       cI  = individual’s litigation costs; and  
       cP = prosecutor’s litigation costs.  
Assume that the parties agree on the  probability of conviction.  If the case goes to trial, 
the expected cost to the individual is rf + cI, and the expected gain to the prosecutor, assuming 
his goal is to maximize expected penalties imposed net of his litigation costs, is rf – cP.  Thus, 
any settlement resulting in a fine between rf – cP and rf + cI would make both parties better off 
because the cost of litigation would be avoided.  The same point would apply if the individual 
were subject to a jail sentence rather than a fine.  Note, however, that if the parties disagree about 
the probability of conviction, a settlement might not occur — specifically, if the individual is 
relatively optimistic and believes that the probability of his being convicted is sufficiently less 
than the prosecutor thinks it is. 
A second benefit of a settlement is that it eliminates the risks inherent in the trial 
outcome, a benefit to parties who are averse to such risks.
61 
 
61 These benefits of settlement are well-recognized in the economic literature on civil litigation; see the 
surveys by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) ) and Spier (2006).  For early discussions of settlement in the context of 
public enforcement, see Landes (1971) and Grossman and Katz (1983), and more recently, see, for example, 
Reinganum (1988), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1989), Kobayashi and Lott (1992), and Miceli (1996).  
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The preceding advantages of settlement to the parties suggest that settlement is socially 
valuable, but the effect of settlement on deterrence is a complicating factor.  Specifically, 
settlements dilute deterrence: for if individuals desire to settle, it must be because the expected 
disutility of sanctions is lowered for them.  However, because settlements reflect the sanctions 
that would be imposed at trial, the state may be able to offset this settlement-related reduction in 
deterrence by increasing the level of sanctions.  If so, settlements need not compromise the 
overall level of deterrence.
62  
Settlements may have other socially undesirable consequences.  First, they may result in 
sanctions that are not as well tailored to harmful acts as would be true of court-determined 
sanctions.  Second, settlements hinder the amplification and development of the law through the 
setting of precedents.  Third, settlements also sometimes allow individuals to keep aspects of 
their behavior secret, which can reduce deterrence.  Fourth, settlements for prison terms can 
result in increases in public expenditures on jail if individuals are risk averse in imprisonment.
63  
A prosecutor whose goal is to maximize social welfare, as opposed to maximizing the expected 
sanction less prosecution costs, presumably would take these additional factors into account and 
sometimes refuse to settle even though the settlement saves litigation costs and avoids risk.
64 
 
 
 
62 The deterrence-diluting effects of settlement and other aspects of the social desirability of settlement 
have been discussed in the private litigation context by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988), Shavell (1997a), and Spier 
(1997).  A related discussion in the public enforcement context appears in Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1989). 
63 For example, suppose a defendant faces a 50% chance of a 5 year sentence and a 50% chance of a 15 
year sentence, with an expected sentence of 10 years.  If he is risk averse, he will strictly prefer a certain sentence of 
10 years.  This implies that if prosecutors want to maintain deterrence, they must demand a settlement of more than 
10 years, say 12 years, which increases the cost of imprisonment. 
64 The question of what prosecutors maximize has received almost no attention from law and economics 
scholars, although two exceptions are Miceli (1996) and Glaeser et al. (2000).  
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21.  SELF-REPORTING 
We have assumed that individuals are subject to sanctions only if they are detected by an 
enforcement agent, but in fact parties sometimes disclose their own violations to enforcement 
authorities.  For example, firms often report violations of environmental and safety regulations, 
individuals usually notify police of their involvement in traffic accidents, and even criminals 
occasionally turn themselves in. 
Self-reporting can be induced by lowering the sanction for individuals who disclose their 
own infractions.  To avoid significantly reducing deterrence, however, the reward for self-
reporting can be made relatively small.  For example, suppose that the fine if an individual does 
not self report is $1,000 and that the probability of detection is 10%, so the expected fine is $100. 
 If the fine if one self-reports is $99, individuals will self-report but deterrence will barely be 
reduced. 
To express this formally, assume for simplicity that individuals are risk neutral, and 
suppose that if an individual commits a violation and does not self-report, his expected fine is pf. 
 Let 
        fN = fine if a violator self-reports, 
and set 
  fN = pf – ε, (28) 
where ε > 0 is small.  A violator will therefore want to self-report because fN  is less than pf, but 
the deterrent effect of the sanction will approximate that if he did not self-report. 
Given that self-reporting can be induced essentially without compromising deterrence, 
why is self-reporting socially advantageous?  One reason is that self-reporting lowers 
enforcement costs because the enforcement authority does not have to identify and prove who 
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the violator was.  Environmental enforcers do not need to spend as much effort trying to detect 
pollution and establishing its source if firms that pollute report that fact.
65  Second, self-reporting 
reduces risk, and thus is advantageous if individuals are risk averse.  Drivers bear less risk 
because they know that if they cause an accident, they will be led to report this to the police and 
suffer a lower and certain sanction (of approximately pf), rather than face a substantially higher 
sanction imposed only with some probability.  Third, self-reporting may allow harm to be 
mitigated.  Early identification of a toxic leak, for example, will facilitate its containment and 
clean-up.
66 
 
22.  REPEAT OFFENDERS 
In practice, the law often sanctions repeat offenders more severely than first-time 
offenders.  For example, under the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s sentencing guidelines for 
Federal crimes, both imprisonment terms and criminal fines are enhanced if an offender has a 
prior record.  Civil money penalties also sometimes depend on whether the offender has a record 
of prior offenses.  We explain here why such policies may be socially desirable. 
Note first that sanctioning repeat offenders more severely cannot be socially 
advantageous if deterrence always induces first-best behavior.  If the sanction for polluting and 
causing a $1,000 harm is $1,000, then any person who pollutes and pays $1,000 is a person 
 
65 In some contexts, however, self-reporting will not save enforcement costs.  For example, suppose that a 
police officer waits by the side of a road to spot speeders.  Then, were a driver to report that he had sped, this would 
not reduce policing costs, presuming that the officer still needs to be stationed at the roadside to watch for other 
speeders.  Usually, though, there would be some cost savings as a result of self-reporting (for example, the police 
officer would not have to chase as many speeders). 
66 The basic theory of self-reporting in public enforcement is developed in Kaplow and Shavell (1994b); 
see also Malik (1993) and Innes (1999).  Related literature concerns the reporting of income by individuals to tax 
authorities and the reporting of costs by regulated firms to regulatory authorities.  See, for example, Andreoni et al. 
(1998) and Laffont and Tirole (1993).  
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whose gain from polluting (say the savings from not installing pollution control equipment) must 
have exceeded $1,000.  Social welfare therefore is higher as a result of his polluting.  If such an 
individual polluted and was sanctioned in the past, that only means that it was socially desirable 
for him to have polluted previously.  Raising the sanction because of his having a record of prior 
convictions would overdeter him now. 
Accordingly, only if deterrence is inadequate is it possibly desirable to condition 
sanctions on offense history to increase deterrence.  But deterrence often will be inadequate 
because, as we emphasized in section 7.1, it will usually be worthwhile for the state to tolerate 
some underdeterrence in order to reduce enforcement expenses. 
Given that there is underdeterrence, making sanctions depend on offense history may be 
beneficial for two reasons.  First, the use of offense history may create an additional incentive 
not to violate the law: if detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanction, but also 
a higher sanction for a future violation, an individual will be deterred more from committing a 
violation presently.
67  Second, making sanctions depend on offense history allows society to take 
advantage of information about the dangerousness of individuals and the need to deter them: 
individuals with offense histories may be more likely than average to commit future violations, 
which might make it desirable for purposes of deterrence to impose higher sanctions on them.
68  
 
67 There is a subtlety in demonstrating the optimality of punishing repeat offenses more severely.  Namely, 
if there is a problem of underdeterrence, one might wonder why it would not be optimal to raise the sanction to the 
maximum level for every offense (in which case repeat offenses would not be punished more severely).  It must be 
shown that punishing all offenses maximally is inferior to punishing first offenses less than maximally and 
punishing repeat offenses more severely.  See Polinsky and Shavell (1998) on the possible optimality of making 
sanctions depend on offense history because of the additional deterrence that such a policy creates.  Miceli and 
Bucci (2005) supply a different reason for raising the fine for the second offense — that there is little additional 
social stigma associated with a second offense, so that a higher sanction is needed to maintain deterrence.  Emons 
(2003), however, raises the possibility that it may be optimal to lower the sanction for the second offense. 
68 Note that this reason for making sanctions depend on offense history is different from the first reason: the 
second reason involves the assumption that offenders are different and that the optimal sanction for some offenders 
is higher than for others; the first reason applies even if individuals are identical.  On the second, information-based, 
reason for making sanctions depend on offense history, see Rubinstein (1979), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), and  
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There is also an incapacitation-based reason for making sanctions depend on offense 
history.  Repeat offenders are more likely to have higher propensities to commit violations in the 
future and thus more likely to be worth incapacitating by imprisonment.
69  
 
23.  IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PROBABILITY AND MAGNITUDE OF 
SANCTIONS 
Although we have made the simplifying assumption that individuals know the probability 
of detection and the magnitude of sanctions, it is obvious that individuals frequently have 
imperfect knowledge of these variables.  They generally possess only subjective probability 
distributions of the probability of a sanction and its magnitude.  They might not know the true 
probability of a sanction for several reasons: because the enforcement authority refrains from 
publishing information about the probability (perhaps hoping that individuals will believe it to be 
higher than it is); because the probability depends on factors that individuals do not fully 
understand (the probability of a tax audit, for example, is influenced by factors that are kept 
secret from taxpayers); and because probabilities might be difficult for individuals to assess.
70  
Also, individuals may have incomplete knowledge of the true magnitudes of sanctions, 
particularly if sanctions are not fixed by law, but are to some degree discretionary.
71  
The implications of individuals’ imperfect knowledge are straightforward to ascertain.  
 
Chu et al. (2000). 
69 See section 25 for a discussion of the incapacitation rationale for the use of imprisonment sanctions. 
70 On the problems that individuals have in evaluating and using probabilities, see, for example, Kahneman 
et al. (1982). 
71 In addition, individuals could have imperfect information about the prevailing standard of liability, not 
being sure whether it is strict or fault-based.  This type of mistake, about a discrete issue, seems less likely to be 
significant than errors in assessing the probability and magnitude of sanctions.  
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First, to predict how individuals behave, what is relevant, of course, is not the actual probability 
and magnitude of a sanction, but perceptions of them. 
Second, to determine the optimal probability and magnitude of sanctions, account must 
be taken of the relationship between the actual and the perceived values.  To illustrate, suppose 
that the perceived probability is a single value p ^(p), where p ^ is increasing in the true probability 
p, and, similarly, that the perceived fine is f ^(f), where f ^ is increasing in the true fine f.  Thus, if 
the probability of detection p is fixed, the optimal fine is set such that p ^(p)f ^(f) = h, assuming such 
a fine is feasible.  This might imply a higher or a lower fine than when perceptions are accurate. 
Third, the result that the optimal fine should be maximal when individuals are risk neutral 
continues to hold.  By raising the fine to the maximum, the perceived fine also will be maximal.  
The probability of detection then can be lowered, thereby saving enforcement costs without 
reducing deterrence. 
Several other observations are worth making.  One concerns lags in learning about 
changes in enforcement policy.  For example, suppose that there is a delay of at least a year 
before individuals fully comprehend a change in the probability of enforcement.  Then if 
enforcement resources are increased so as to make the probability, say, 15% rather than 10%, 
there might not be a significant increase in deterrence for some time, making such an investment 
less worthwhile.
72  Another observation involves the difficulty in learning about variations in 
enforcement policy when enforcement policy is described by a distribution.  For instance, 
suppose that the sanction for some act, such as robbery, can vary (say from one month of jail 
time to 10 years), and that individuals’ perceptions are quite rough, not based on true averages, 
 
72 Similarly, suppose that individuals treat all probabilities of enforcement that are low, say below 1%, as if 
they were probabilities of 1%, because it is not possible for individuals to make discriminations finer than 1%.  Then 
if the actual probability is ½%, spending more on enforcement to make the probability 1% would not be beneficial 
because deterrence would not increase.  
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but mainly on the possible range of sanctions.  Then increasing the average sentence within this 
range might have very little effect on deterrence.  The processes by which individuals formulate 
probabilities of sanctions and their magnitudes are important, therefore, to determining optimal 
deterrence policy.
73 
 
24.  CORRUPTION 
In this section we examine the possible corruption of law enforcement agents, how 
corruption lessens deterrence and distorts participation in harm-creating activities, and what 
policies may be employed to combat corruption.
74  One form of corruption is bribery, in which a 
law enforcer accepts a payment in return for not reporting a violation (or for reducing the 
mandated sanction for the violation).  For example, in consideration of a bribe payment, a police 
officer may overlook a speeding violation or a building inspector may ignore a code infraction.  
(For simplicity, we do not distinguish between a bribe offered by an individual and an extortion 
demand made by the enforcer — a payment for not turning in the individual.)  A second form of 
corruption is framing and framing-related extortion, in which an enforcement agent may frame 
an innocent individual or threaten to frame him in order to extort money from him.  
One reason bribery is socially undesirable is that it dilutes deterrence of violations of law. 
 This is because bribery results in a lower payment by an individual than the sanction for the 
offense.  To be concrete, let 
 
73 Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992) consider imperfect information about the probability of sanctions and 
emphasize that maximal sanctions may not be socially desirable.  See also Kaplow (1990a), which takes into 
account learning about whether acts are subject to sanctions, and Sah (1991), which focuses on the process by which 
individuals form perceptions of the probability of detection. 
74 The discussion in this section is based principally on Polinsky and Shavell (2001).  We do not examine 
the corruption of the government procurement process, such as the payment of a bribe to a government agent in 
order to obtain a defense contract. 
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          λ  = fraction obtained by the enforcer of the surplus from a bribe agreement. 
Therefore, because the surplus from a bribe agreement is the fine f, an individual pays a bribe of 
λf.  To the degree that λ is less than one, there is underdeterrence.
75  Similarly, bribery leads to 
excessive participation in the harm-creating activity. 
Framing and framing-related extortion also dilute deterrence of violations of law.  The 
reason is that framing and extortion imply that those who act innocently face an expected 
sanction, so that the difference between the expected sanction if individuals commit a violation 
and if they do not is lessened.  If, for example, individuals who violate the law face an expected 
fine of $1,000 and innocent individuals face an expected fine of $200 due to the risk of being 
extorted or framed, the additional cost to an innocent individual of committing the offense is 
$800 instead of $1,000.  (This point is essentially the same as the observation in section 15 that 
mistaken convictions dilute deterrence.)  Additionally, framing and framing-related extortion 
undesirably discourage participation in the harm-creating activity. 
Because corruption dilutes deterrence and distorts activity decisions, its control may be 
socially desirable.  One way to reduce corruption is to impose fines (or imprisonment sentences) 
on individuals caught engaging in bribery, extortion, and framing.  For example, suppose there is 
a fine for bribery imposed on the enforcer with a probability.  Let 
        fB = fine imposed on the enforcer for engaging in bribery; and 
       pB = probability that an enforcer is caught engaging in bribery. 
Bribery will be deterred if the surplus from a bribe agreement is eliminated, that is, if pB fB $ f.  
Otherwise, the bribe payment will be pB fB + λ(f – pB fB), which exceeds λf, so that deterrence of 
the offense is greater due to the sanctioning of bribery.  For previously discussed reasons, the 
 
75 Garoupa and Klerman (2004) discuss how the threat of an imprisonment sanction for the offense will 
lead the offender to pay a higher bribe than otherwise, thereby reducing the deterrence-diluting effect of bribery.  
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optimal fine to impose on risk-neutral parties for engaging in bribery maximal, and the optimal 
fine for enforcers who frame innocent individuals also is maximal.  But, surprisingly, framing-
related extortion should not be penalized.
76 
Corruption also can be reduced by paying enforcers rewards for reporting violations.  
Such payments will reduce their incentive to accept bribes because they will sacrifice their 
rewards if they fail to report violations.  Indeed, sufficiently high rewards would eliminate all 
incentives to accept bribes.  But high rewards may not be optimal because they give enforcers a 
greater incentive to frame innocent individuals, and high rewards tend to increase framing-
related extortion payments (because enforcers sacrifice more by accepting the extortion 
payment).  The optimal reward balances the beneficial effect of using rewards to offset the 
dilution of deterrence due to bribery with the detrimental effects associated with increased 
framing and extortion of innocent individuals. 
A third way to control corruption is to pay enforcers more than their reservation wage 
(that is, to pay them an efficiency wage).  Then they would have more to lose if punished for 
corrupt behavior and denied future employment.  There is, however, a social cost to the state of 
paying enforcers more than the wage necessary to attract them C the distortions caused by the 
additional taxes needed to make such payments. 
The discussion to this point implicitly presumed that the fine for the harmful act is fixed.  
A question that naturally arises, however, is whether the deterrence-diluting effects of corruption 
can be offset by raising the fine on offenders.  For example, suppose that the optimal fine would 
 
 
76 The kernel of the reason is that penalizing framing-related extortion will lead to one of two detrimental 
consequences: it will either fail to deter extortion and result in higher costs to innocent individuals (the sum of their 
expected extortion payment and the expected fine on them for paying extortion); or else it will cause enforcers to 
switch from extorting money from innocent individuals to actually framing them, which is socially worse.  This 
result is demonstrated in Polinsky and Shavell (2001), which also discusses qualifications to this point.  
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be $100 if a fine were always paid when an offender is caught, but that bribery results in a bribe 
payment equal to $50, one half of the fine.  Could not the fine on an offender be increased to 
$200, so that the bribe would then be $100 and the effective penalty be exactly what is desired?  
In the basic risk-neutral model of enforcement, it is not possible to raise the fine because the 
optimal fine is maximal.  More realistically, however, the optimal fine is less than maximal for a 
variety of reasons, including those related to risk aversion, marginal deterrence, and general 
enforcement.  Then, while it would be possible to raise the fine to offset the deterrence-diluting 
effects of corruption, doing so would lead to social costs (for example, greater bearing of risk) 
and might not be desirable.
77 
 
25.  INCAPACITATION 
Our discussion of public enforcement has presumed that the threat of sanctions reduces 
harm by discouraging individuals from causing harm — that is, by deterring them.  However, a 
different way for society to reduce harm is by imposing sanctions that remove parties from 
positions in which they are able to cause harm — that is, by incapacitating them.  Imprisonment 
is the primary incapacitative sanction, although there are other examples: individuals can lose 
their drivers licenses, preventing them from doing harm while driving; businesses can lose their 
right to operate in certain domains, and the like.  We focus here on imprisonment, but what we 
say applies to incapacitative sanctions generally. 
 
77 Becker and Stigler (1974) focus on the control of bribery and consider paying rewards to enforcers or 
requiring them to post bonds that would be forfeited if they are caught engaging in bribery.  Mookherjee and Png 
(1995) analyze bribery and conclude, given their assumption that fines are unbounded, that it is optimal to eliminate 
bribery.  Bowles and Garoupa (1997) also discuss the control of bribery through sanctions.  Hindriks et al. (1999) 
study bribery and extortion in the context of tax evasion, and examine rewards and penalties as methods of control.  
Other writing on corruption includes Pashigian (1975), Klitgaard (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bardhan 
(1997), and Rose-Ackerman (1999); several of these articles focus on corruption in the awarding of government 
contracts and licenses rather than corruption in the imposition of sanctions for violations of law.  
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To better understand public enforcement when sanctions are incapacitative, suppose that 
their sole function is to incapacitate; that is, assume for simplicity that sanctions do not deter.  
(For instance, deterrence might not occur if, given the relevant range of the probabilities and 
magnitudes of the sanctions, individuals’ gains from harmful acts exceed the expected 
sanctions.)  Let 
       h(t) = harm that would be caused by an individual at age t if not in jail. 
We assume that h(t) either is constant or declines with age. 
  Assuming that the social goal is to minimize the sum of the harm and the cost c of 
incarceration,
78 the optimal policy is to keep an individual in jail as long as h(t) > c.  In other 
words, if the harm the individual would cause exceeds the cost of imprisonment, an individual 
should be put in prison and kept there as long as the harm continues to exceed the cost of 
imprisonment.  He should be released otherwise.  Put differently, the optimal prison term as a 
function of potential harm caused is zero up to a threshold — the point at which harm equals the 
cost of imprisonment — and then rises discontinuously to the length of time during which the 
person’s harm if released would exceed imprisonment costs.  Jail should only be used to 
incapacitate individuals who otherwise would have caused relatively high harm. 
Two points about the incapacitative rationale are important to note.  First, evidence exists 
suggesting that the harm caused by individuals declines with their age.
79  Thus, from the 
incapacitative standpoint, it often will be desirable to release older prisoners from jail.  Second, 
as a matter of logic, the incapacitative rationale might imply that a person should be put in jail 
even if he has not committed a crime — if his danger to society makes incapacitating him 
 
78 For simplicity, we are not taking into account here the gains that individuals obtain from committing 
offenses or the disutility that individuals bear from time in jail. 
 
79  See, for example, Wilson and Herrnstein (1985, pp. 126-147) and U.S. Department of Justice (1997a, 
pp. 371, table 4.4, 378-379, table 4.7).   
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worthwhile.  This would be true, for example, if there were some accurate way to predict a 
person’s dangerousness independently of his actual behavior.  In practice, however, the fact that 
a person has committed a harmful act may be a good basis for predicting his future behavior, in 
which case the incapacitation rationale would imply that a jail term should be imposed only if the 
individual has committed an especially harmful act. 
The optimal probability of detection is determined by a straightforward tradeoff.  The 
higher the probability, the greater the number of individuals who will be incapacitated, resulting 
in social gains equal to the difference between the harm that individuals would cause and the cost 
of their incapacitation.  But the higher the probability, the higher are enforcement costs.  At some 
point, it is optimal to stop raising the probability, when the marginal social gains just equal the 
marginal cost of raising the probability. 
Last, we briefly comment on the relationship between the nature of optimal enforcement 
when incapacitation is the goal versus when deterrence is the goal.  First, when incapacitation is 
the goal, the optimal length of the prison term (which is determined by the condition that h(t) > 
c) is independent of the probability of apprehension.  In contrast, when deterrence is the goal, the 
optimal sanction depends on the probability — the sanction generally is higher the lower is the 
probability.  Second, when incapacitation is the goal, the probability and magnitude of sanctions 
are independent of the ability to deter.  Thus, for example, if this ability is limited (consider 
individuals who commit crimes while enraged), a low expected sanction may be optimal under 
the deterrence rationale, but a high expected sanction still might be called for to incapacitate.
80  
 
 
80 See Shavell (1987a) for a theoretical examination of optimal incapacitation policy, Ehrlich (1981, pp. 
315-316, 319-321) for a model used to estimate the relative importance of incapacitation and deterrence, and Levitt 
(1998) and Kessler and Levitt (1999) for empirical studies of incapacitation and deterrence.  Economists have paid 
much less attention to incapacitation than to deterrence, despite the significance of the incapacitation rationale in 
criminal law enforcement.  
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26.  COSTLY OBSERVATION OF WEALTH 
  In our prior discussions of optimal sanctions, we implicitly assumed that the enforcement 
authority could costlessly observe individuals’ wealth levels.  Knowing wealth levels, the 
enforcement authority then chose the sanctions to impose, fines and/or imprisonment sentences.  
In fact, however, individuals and firms may be able to hide assets from government enforcers, 
including by hoarding cash, transferring assets to relatives or related legal entities, or moving 
money to offshore bank accounts.  In this section we consider optimal sanctions when an 
individual’s level of wealth can be observed only after a costly audit or not at all.
81 
Suppose first that the enforcement authority employs fines as sanctions and can audit an 
individual who claims that he cannot pay the fine.  If the audit determines that the individual 
misrepresented his wealth level, he can be fined for having lied about his wealth.  Assume for 
simplicity that this fine is independent of the degree of misrepresentation.  The enforcement 
authority’s problem is to choose, so as to maximize social welfare, the probability of detecting 
the offense, the fine for the offense, the probability of an audit conditional on the individual’s 
claiming that he cannot pay the fine, and the fine for misrepresentation of wealth.  Without loss 
of generality, we assume that if the latter fine is applicable, it is imposed instead of the fine for 
the offense (rather than in addition to the fine for the offense). 
It can be demonstrated that the optimal fine for misrepresenting one’s wealth level equals 
the fine for the offense divided by the audit probability, and therefore generally exceeds the fine 
for the offense.  This is a natural generalization of the formula for the optimal fine, given the 
probability of detection, which is the harm divided by the probability.  In effect, the “harm” from 
 
81 The discussion in this section is based on Polinsky (2004a; 2004b).  See also Chu and Jiang (1993) and 
Levitt (1997), who consider the choice between fines and imprisonment when wealth cannot be discovered by the 
enforcement authority at any cost (in Chu and Jiang’s case, this assumption is implicit), and Garoupa (1998), who 
investigates optimal fines when the enforcement authority is assumed to costlessly observe an underestimate of 
offenders’ wealth levels.  
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the act of concealing one’s wealth is the failure to pay the fine for the original offense, so the 
optimal fine for concealment is this harm divided by the applicable probability of being caught if 
one engages in it. 
Assuming the harmful act is worth controlling, the optimal audit probability is positive, 
increases as the cost of an audit declines, and equals one if the cost is sufficiently low.  Auditing 
is valuable because it reduces misrepresentation of wealth and thereby increases deterrence.  If 
the optimal audit probability is less than one, however, some individuals who are capable of 
paying the fine for the offense will misrepresent their wealth levels.  Unlike in the basic analysis 
in which wealth is assumed to be costlessly observable, the optimal fine for the offense now 
results in underdeterrence, due to the cost of auditing wealth levels.  By reducing the fine for the 
offense from the level that would lead to first-best behavior, fewer individuals will misrepresent 
their wealth levels, so auditing costs decline.  The reduction in deterrence has no first-order 
effect on social welfare because the marginal individuals who are induced to commit the offense 
have gains equal to the harm from the offense. 
Next suppose that the enforcement authority simply cannot observe wealth, say because 
the cost of an audit is prohibitively high.
82  If the enforcement authority would have used fines 
alone if it could have observed wealth at no cost, it would have imposed a higher fine on higher-
wealth individuals.
83  It obviously cannot do this now.  Instead, it may be desirable to use the 
threat of an imprisonment sentence to induce individuals capable of paying a higher fine to do 
so.  Specifically, if there are two levels of wealth, the enforcement authority might set the fine 
 
 
82 The following discussion introduces imprisonment as an alternative, or supplement, to fines.  For 
simplicity, imprisonment was not considered above in the discussion of auditing.  
 
83 For now familiar reasons, it would have done this to reduce or eliminate the underdeterrence that 
otherwise would occur if the fine were the same as for low-wealth individuals.  
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greater than the wealth level of the low-wealth individuals and impose an imprisonment sentence 
on any individuals who do not pay this fine.  By using an imprisonment sentence in this way, 
high-wealth individuals can be induced to pay a higher fine, which is socially beneficial, though 
low-wealth individuals now will incur a socially costly sanction, imprisonment.  In other words, 
when wealth is not observable, it may be desirable to impose a costly sanction — imprisonment 
sentences — on low-wealth individuals in order to better deter high-wealth offenders through a 
cheap sanction — fines.  
Another possibility is that the enforcement authority would have used both fines and 
imprisonment if it could have observed wealth at no cost.  Perhaps surprisingly, the inability to 
observe wealth is of no consequence in this case.  The reason, in essence, is that the mix of fines 
and imprisonment that would be chosen when wealth is observable will impose a higher burden 
(though a lower fine) on low-wealth individuals.  Thus, high-wealth individuals will naturally 
want to identify themselves.  Specifically, they will prefer to pay a higher fine and bear a shorter 
imprisonment sentence than to masquerade as low-wealth individuals, who will bear longer 
imprisonment sentences and a higher overall burden.  Consequently, the same mix of sanctions 
that would have been imposed on both groups if wealth were costlessly observable can be used 
when wealth is not observable. 
In summary, information about wealth levels is useful only if the enforcement authority 
would want to impose a higher burden of sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-
wealth individuals, for then high-wealth individuals would pretend to be low-wealth individuals 
if wealth could not be observed.  This is the case if the enforcement authority would want to use 
fines alone.  If, however, the enforcement authority would want to impose a lower burden of 
sanctions on high-wealth individuals than on low-wealth individuals, high-wealth individuals 
will voluntarily bear such sanctions even if they include a higher fine.  This case is applicable  
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when the enforcement authority would want to use fines and imprisonment together.  Monitoring 
of wealth levels may be worthwhile in the first case, but is not needed in the second case. 
  
27.  SOCIAL NORMS 
  Although we have restricted attention to public enforcement of law, social norms and 
morality should be mentioned because they influence in significant ways the attainment of 
desired behavior.
84  By social norms (or moral rules), we mean conduct — such as keeping 
promises, not lying, and not harming others — that is associated with certain distinctive 
psychological and social attributes.  In particular, social norms influence behavior partly through 
internal incentives: when a person obeys a moral rule, he will tend to feel virtuous, and if he 
disobeys the rule, he will tend to feel guilty.  Social norms also influence behavior through 
external incentives: when a person is observed by another party to have obeyed a moral rule, that 
party may bestow praise on the first party, who will enjoy the praise; and if the person is 
observed by the other party to have disobeyed the rule, the second party will tend to disapprove 
of the first party, who will dislike the disapproval.
   
  Because social norms affect behavior through the foregoing moral incentives, some 
socially desirable conduct can be encouraged reasonably well without employing the legal 
system.
85  For example, whether an individual cuts in line at the movie theater, keeps his lunch 
engagements, or lets his children make a nuisance of themselves at the supermarket, is controlled 
with rough success by internal and external moral incentives.  Such conduct generally can be 
regulated satisfactorily by moral incentives alone because, among other things, internal 
 
84 On social norms and the law, see generally McAdams and Rasmusen (2006).  See also University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1996) and Posner (1997). 
  
85 For a comparison of social norms and law enforcement as means of controlling behavior, see Shavell 
(2002).   
 
 
- 66 - 
                                                                                                                                                            
incentives work automatically (we know when we have done the wrong thing), external 
incentives are likely to apply (if a person cuts in line, this will be noticed), and the benefits from 
violations are not large, so that they can be outweighed relatively easily by the force of the moral 
incentives.  
  The need for formal law enforcement stems from two principal considerations.  First, 
much conduct that society desires cannot be controlled through moral incentives alone.  One 
reason is that the private gains from undesirable conduct are often large.  The utility obtained by 
a robber, a tax cheat, or a polluter may be substantial, and dominate the moral incentives.  
Another reason is that external moral sanctions might be imposed only with a low probability 
(the robber, tax cheat, or polluter might not be spotted by others).  A second rationale for formal 
law enforcement is that the social harm from failing to control an act through moral incentives 
may be large.  This makes the expense of law enforcement worth incurring (as in the case of 
robbery, but not of cutting in line at movie theaters). 
Although we have been treating social norms and formal law enforcement as distinct 
ways of controlling behavior, law enforcement might also influence social norms.
86  For 
instance, enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination based on race may change beliefs about 
proper conduct (reinforcing internal moral incentives) and lead to a greater willingness of 
individuals to express disapproval when they witness discriminatory behavior (enhancing 
external moral incentives).  The importance of the effect of law on social norms may be limited, 
however, to the extent that social norms are mainly the result of early childhood experience and 
the messages conveyed by parents and other authority figures, such as educators. 
 
 
 
86 See, for example, McAdams (1997) and Sunstein (1996).  
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28.  FAIRNESS 
To this point we have not considered the possibility that individuals have opinions about 
the fairness of sanctions or the arbitrariness of enforcement.
87 
Suppose, first, that individuals believe that sanctions should be imposed on those who 
have committed certain bad acts and that the magnitude of sanctions should reflect the gravity of 
the acts.  A formal assumption that captures this view is that individuals obtain fairness-related 
utility from the imposition of sanctions on those who committed the bad acts, where this utility is 
maximized at a fairness-ideal level of sanction that depends on the harmfulness (or a related 
aspect) of the acts.  The fairness-ideal sanction may be lower or higher than the conventionally 
optimal sanction that we have discussed above.  Note in particular that the fairness-ideal sanction 
does not depend on the probability of detection, whereas the conventionally optimal sanction is 
higher the lower is the probability of detection, suggesting that if the probability of detection is 
sufficiently low, the conventionally optimal sanction will exceed the fairness-ideal sanction.  In 
any case, when fairness-related utility is taken into account along with the other elements of 
social welfare considered above, the optimal sanction will be a compromise between the 
fairness-ideal sanction and the conventionally optimal sanction. 
When both the probability and magnitude of sanctions may be varied, the conventional 
solution to the enforcement problem also is altered because of fairness considerations.  As 
discussed previously, if individuals are risk neutral, the usual solution consists of the highest 
possible sanction and a relatively low probability.  When the issue of fairness is added to the 
 
 
87 The discussion in this section is based on Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) and Kaplow and Shavell (2002, 
pp. 291-378), the latter of which relates the economic analysis of fairness in enforcement to the philosophical 
literature.  See also Miceli (1991) and Diamond (2002), who derive optimal sanctions taking both deterrence and the 
fairness of sanctions into account, but holding the probability of sanctions fixed. Waldfogel (1993) studies 
empirically whether actual sanctions are better explained by considerations of deterrence or fairness.    
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analysis, however, the usual solution generally is not optimal because a very high sanction will 
be seen as unfair, or more precisely, will result in the lowering of individuals’ fairness-related 
utility.  With respect to double parking, for example, even a sanction of $100 might be 
considered unfair because double parking is regarded as only a slightly bad act.   
A consequence of the desire to keep sanctions at fair levels, meaning quite constrained 
levels for acts that are not very bad or harmful, is that the socially optimal probability of 
detection changes.  One possibility is that the optimal probability would be higher, perhaps much 
higher than the conventionally optimal probability: to achieve a desired level of deterrence with a 
lower fairness-restricted sanction, the probability has to rise.  If the sanction for double parking 
cannot exceed $100 because of fairness considerations, then, to create an expected sanction of 
$10, the probability must be 10%, greatly exceeding the approximately 1/10% probability that 
would be optimal if risk-neutral individuals have wealth of $10,000 and the fine is set at this 
level.  Another possibility, though, is that the optimal probability would be lower than in the 
conventional case: the additional deterrence created by raising the probability might be relatively 
low because the sanction is relatively low; and the lower the deterrent benefit from raising the 
probability, the lower would be the social incentive to devote resources to enforcement. 
Another concept of fairness concerns the probability of detection rather than the 
magnitude of sanctions.  Suppose that individuals consider it unfair for some violators of law to 
be sanctioned when others who were lucky enough not to be caught are not sanctioned.  
Specifically, suppose that individuals experience fairness-related disutility if there is only a 
probability rather than a certainty of sanctions, and their disutility rises the lower the probability 
of detection.  Then the optimal probability would be higher, and therefore the optimal sanction 
would be lower, than in the absence of this fairness-related component of social welfare. 
  A further notion of fairness involves the form of liability, whether liability is strict or  
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based on fault.  Individuals might prefer fault-based liability because sanctions are imposed on 
parties only if they behaved in a socially inappropriate way.  If individuals derive greater 
fairness-related utility from use of fault-based liability, then this form of liability is more likely 
to be optimal than we have suggested previously. 
  A final issue concerns the relevance of fairness considerations when firms, as opposed to 
individuals, are sanctioned.  If sanctions are imposed on firms, then fairness-related utility may 
have to be reconsidered, presuming that what matters in terms of fairness is that the individuals 
responsible for harmful acts bear sanctions as opposed to the artificial legal entity of a firm.  
Specifically, one would want to identify the sanctions actually suffered by such persons within a 
firm if the firm bears a sanction.  For example, if a firm demotes a person who negligently 
caused the firm to incur a sanction, then the person’s loss from the demotion would be the 
fairness-relevant sanction, not the sanction imposed on the firm.  Note, too, that the imposition of 
sanctions on firms often penalizes individuals who are unlikely to be considered responsible for 
the harm, namely shareholders and customers.  To the extent that the fairness goal is to penalize 
responsible individuals within firms, and not firms as entities, the social value of sanctions in 
achieving fairness is attenuated. 
 
29.  CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the theory of public enforcement of law, we want to conclude by 
commenting on two types of private behavior that bear significantly on public law enforcement. 
First, private parties may themselves take actions to prevent being harmed.  For example, 
to reduce the risk of being criminally victimized, individuals might install locks on their 
possessions, carry weapons, or hire security personnel.  These private efforts to prevent or deter 
harmful acts serve as a partial substitute for public efforts; moreover, private efforts are  
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sometimes more efficient than public efforts (citizens may know better where to put locks), 
though they also may be less efficient (public authorities may know better how to assign police). 
 These observations raise important questions about the relationship between private protection 
and public enforcement.  Should private efforts to protect against being victimized be regulated? 
 Does the state spend too little on public enforcement, relying on the fact that private actors often 
undertake their own defensive efforts?  The optimal relationship between private and public 
efforts to control harmful activities deserves more careful examination.
88 
Second, private individuals may bring suits against parties who also may be subject to 
publicly imposed penalties.  For example, a victim of an automobile accident may sue the driver 
who caused the accident, and this driver might also be sanctioned by the state for a driving 
infraction.  Private lawsuits channel harm-creating behavior and thus constitute a substitute, at 
least to some extent, for public enforcement.  This leads one to ask how public enforcement and 
parallel private litigation should be managed.  Should the payment of a public penalty be an 
offset to private damages, and vice versa?  Should the state regulate private litigation so as to 
better coordinate it with public enforcement?  Is public enforcement or private litigation the 
socially cheaper way to accomplish desired behavior?   
A full treatment of the control of harm-creating behavior would address both sets of 
issues just discussed. 
 
 
 88 There is some literature that discusses the issues raised in this paragraph; see, for example, Clotfelter 
(1977; 1978) and Shavell (1991a).  
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